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THE PATH TO PROFITABILITY: REINVIGORATING THE
NEGLECTED PHASE OF MERGER ANALYSIS
John B. Kirkwood and Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr.**
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Justice ("Justice Department") and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC") devote approximately half their antitrust
budgets each year to reviewing and challenging proposed mergers and ac-
quisitions.' Between them, the agencies examine one to two thousand trans-
actions annually2 and their top officials routinely tout their success in halt-
ing the deals they deem anticompetitive.3 Under the new administration,
moreover, merger enforcement is likely to increase, both because President
Obama promised to take a more aggressive approach4 and because the cur-
rent financial crisis threatens to touch off a new round of acquisitions.5
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1 James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of US Federal Antitrust Enforcement:
Learning from Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 2 (2007).
2 See id. at 3 fig.3.
3 See, e.g., Tom Barnett, Message from the AAG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. ANTITRUST Div. UPDATE
(U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Spring 2008, at I, I, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/231424.pdf ("Division staff also excel in their review of and challenges
to mergers and other transactions. Where our investigators discover evidence of an anticompetitive
transaction, they pursue the relief necessary to protect consumer welfare, as they did in 28 transactions
during the last two fiscal years and 10 during the first half of this fiscal year."); Deborah Platt Majoras,
FTC Chairman, Keynote Address at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law 7th Annual Fall Forum: Main-
taining Our Focus at the FTC: Recent Developments and Future Challenges in Protecting Consumers
and Competition, 2 n.2 (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoms/
071115fall.pdf ("Taking a longer look back at the past three fiscal years, the FTC's competition work
has produced 52 merger enforcement actions or withdrawals of mergers ... ").
4 See Jacqueline Bell, Obama to Take Aggressive Stance on Antitrust, COMPETITION LAW360,
Nov. 4, 2008, para. 5, http://competition.law360.com (subscription required). In accord with President
Obama's promise, the new Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division has declared
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With merger enforcement on the rise, it is especially important that
courts and enforcement agencies correctly appraise which mergers and ac-
quisitions are likely to reduce competition.6 While some combinations of
competitors are likely to increase prices, reduce choice, or retard innova-
tion,7 others are likely to enhance the welfare of consumers and society by
lowering costs, improving quality, or stimulating innovation.' In making
this assessment, one issue that is frequently critical is the ease of entry. A
merger cannot create market power-and enable the merged firm to raise
prices to consumers-if the attempt to exercise such power would promptly
cause new firms to enter the market and drive prices back to the competi-
tive level. But if entry is impeded, the merged firm may be able to exploit
its customers for a considerable period of time.9
Courts, however, have long neglected this critical issue. While they
devote considerable effort to the first phase of merger analysis--defining
markets, measuring market shares, and predicting whether the merged firm
would raise prices-most courts have paid inadequate attention to the sec-
ond phase-whether new entrants would reignite competition if the merged
firm did raise prices. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court ignored entry condi-
tions altogether, invalidating mergers without determining whether new
that she will be more active than her predecessor. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Remarks as Prepared for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era 20-21 (May 12, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf ("We are faced with market conditions that force
us to engage in a critical analysis of previous enforcement approaches. That analysis makes clear that
passive monitoring of market participants is not an option.").
5 See Joe Nocera, So When Will Banks Give Loans?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B1 (noting
that an executive of JPMorgan Chase indicated it would use its capital from the Treasury to be "more
active on the acquisition side" and that "Treasury wants banks to acquire each other and is using its
power to inject capital to force a new and wrenching round of bank consolidation"); see also Erin Coe,
Financial Woes to Spur M&A in Oil Industry: Report, COMPETITION LAW360, Oct. 24, 2008, para. 1,
http://competition.law360.com (subscription required) ("The financial crisis will trigger more mergers
and acquisitions for major oil finns and utilities ....").
6 See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 139 (Albert A. Foer ed., 2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/
Mergers%20Chapter%2Ofrom%20%20AAI%2OTransition%2OReport_100520082108.pdf ("The prob-
lem for antitrust enforcement agencies and courts is to distinguish the harmful mergers from the more
common procompetitive or benign ones.").
7 Id. (stating that mergers can cause "higher prices, higher costs, lost opportunities for mutually
beneficial trades, lower quality, a lower rate of development of new and better products, and a reduction
in product variety and consumer choice").
8 See, e.g., id. ("Mergers can benefit the economy, allowing firms to reduce costs, improve prod-
ucts and reduce prices.").
9 Likewise, if entry is difficult, a merger of competing buyers may create monopsony power and
allow the merged firm to exploit its suppliers for a significant period of time.
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entry would promptly cure any competitive problem."° In the 1980s, as the
courts adopted an economic approach to antitrust, entry became a routine
part of merger cases and many contested mergers were allowed on the
ground that barriers to entry were low." Even then, however, judicial analy-
sis of the entry issue was often crude and sometimes openly hostile to the
government. 2 In response, the federal enforcement agencies laid out a more
detailed and sophisticated approach to the entry issue in the April 1992 re-
vision of their Merger Guidelines. 3 This approach, which established the
criteria of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency, improved the quality of
judicial analysis. 4 As we show in this Article, however, most judges still
devote relatively little effort to entry and typically decide the most difficult
aspect-the likelihood of entry-without asking the necessary economic
questions.
We base this conclusion on a review of every decision issued since
April 1992 in which a merger challenge litigated by the federal government
was resolved. 5 In this Article, we focus on two fundamental questions: (1)
10 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-46 (1962); see also United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-79 (1966); id. at 292 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court
completely disregards the obvious procreative vigor of competition in the market as reflected in the
turbulent history of entry and exit ...."). Following these decisions, the FTC declared that low entry
barriers could not nullify the effects of a horizontal merger. See In re Am. Brake Shoe Co., 73 F.T.C.
610, 683-84 (1968), aff'das modified sub nom. ABEX Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1970).
11 See Malcolm B. Coate & James Langenfeld, Entry Under the Merger Guidelines 1982-1992, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 557, 559, 568-69 (1993). Coate and Langenfeld found that entry was decisive in
many of the merger cases in the 1980s, and that "[1]ow barriers were found in 10 of 27 post-Guidelines'
merger challenges litigated in federal court." Id. at 569.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983-84 (D.C. Cir. 1990). As Pro-
fessor Baker observed, the opinion "reads like an exasperated effort to rein in a runaway agency thought
to have willfully ignored the teaching of Waste Management." Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with
Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 368 (1997);
see also United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984) (scolding the govern-
ment for ignoring its own Guidelines, which expressed a policy against challenging mergers when entry
was easy).
13 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0
(rev. 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]; see also Coate & Langenfeld, supra note
11, at 577 ("The revision of the entry section elaborates on the official position of the enforcement
agencies .... ).
14 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3. These three criteria, described in more detail
infra Part IA, break down the entry issue into its principal components: (I) could entry occur reasona-
bly quickly? (2) is it likely to occur? and (3) would it be sufficient to restore competition?
15 As of this writing, there are thirty-five such decisions involving a total of twenty-eight mergers.
Seven of the mergers produced two decisions, one by a district court and another by an appellate court.
Appendix A lists and summarizes the results of all thirty-five decisions.
While no other article has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of these decisions or proposed the
framework for litigating the entry issue we set forth below, three previous articles have been especially
helpful: (I) Malcolm Coate's and James Langenfeld's review of entry decisions in the decade between
the 1982 Guidelines and the 1992 revision (Coate & Langenfeld, supra note 11); (2) Jonathan Baker's
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whether the courts have adopted the three criteria laid out in the 1992
Guidelines and (2) whether judicial analysis of the most difficult of those
criteria-likelihood-has been economically sound. In addressing the sec-
ond question, we rely principally on economic theory rather than empirical
evidence, since there are no empirical studies of the likelihood of entry in
response to an anticompetitive postmerger price increase. 6
We found that no court disagreed in principle with any of the Guide-
lines criteria. None of the thirty-five decisions suggest that any of the crite-
ria are wrong in concept, and only a few cases appear to ignore or com-
pletely misunderstand one of them. The thiee criteria have not, however,
become the accepted framework for judicial analysis. Only one of the
thirty-five decisions analyzed entry by addressing each of the Guidelines
criteria. Instead, the courts almost always resolved the entry issue by asking
whether the relevant market was protected by entry barriers. The Guide-
lines, in contrast, do not even mention entry barriers.
Only one of the thirty-five decisions defined an entry barrier. The rest
appeared to conceive of an entry barrier as any obstacle that reduces the
speed, likelihood, or impact of entry. While that notion meshes with the
Guidelines' approach to entry and one of the leading economic definitions
of an entry barrier, it is not adequate by itself to resolve the entry issue.
Without determining the magnitude of such an obstacle, it is not possible to
determine whether it would impede entry so much that entry would actually
be unlikely or untimely or insufficient. Large capital requirements, for ex-
ample, are an entry barrier under the courts' approach, because they reduce
the number of potential entrants and thus the overall probability of entry.
These requirements need not make entry unlikely, however, for a large firm
could find it quite profitable to enter despite the amount of capital required.
This lack of rigor in appraising the entry issue often showed up in
other ways as well. The courts almost never analyzed the entry issue in
depth. To the contrary, their discussions of entry were usually brief and
sometimes cursory, typically occupying a page or a paragraph-or just a
few sentences-in a much longer opinion. In addition, several courts over-
looked or completely misunderstood one of the Guidelines' criteria. A few
decisions, for example, concluded that entry was unlikely simply because it
was costly-without asking whether it was profitable to incur those costs.
This apparent lack of concern with the profitability of entry was quite wide-
spread. None of the thirty-five decisions determined how much business an
analysis of the entry section of the 1992 Guidelines and his discussion of several subsequent cases
(Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger
Guidelines, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 201-02 (2003)); and (3) Steven Salop's economic analysis of entry
conditions in a hypothetical merger case (Steven C. Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST
BULL. 551 (1986)).
16 We look briefly at the empirical literature that does exist because it is helpful in identifying the
features of market structure that are likely to impede entry. See infra Part l.B.2.
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entrant would need to be profitable, and only a small number assessed the
likely reactions of customers and established firms, even though those reac-
tions are critical to an entrant's success. Finally, almost no case asked
whether the prospects of new entry would be reduced if the merger created
the efficiencies the merging parties claimed it would.
Despite these shortcomings, no court at either the trial or the appellate
level was ever reversed on the entry issue. As a result, judges have gener-
ally become comfortable with a quick look at entry conditions, in which
barriers are likely to be identified but their height is not determined, and the
economic questions necessary to determine the likelihood of entry are not
raised or resolved. 7
This reluctance to analyze the entry issue in depth may reflect a mis-
understanding of the purpose of entry analysis. Many courts may not under-
stand that although precedent allows them to do so, their job is not simply
to identify the existence of entry barriers, but to determine whether they are
large enough to prevent entry from eroding an anticompetitive price in-
crease. More important, we believe, is the difficulty of evaluating the likeli-
hood of new entry, particularly for generalist judges. 8 Indeed, Areeda, Ho-
venkamp, and Solow maintain that the uncertainties are so great that the
courts are probably not competent to handle the entry issue, except in cases
of "clearly negligible barriers."' 9 We disagree.
In our view, it is premature to conclude that the entry issue is beyond
the capacity of the courts. As the opinions in FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc.,"°
FTC v. Swedish Match,"' and FTC v. Staples, Inc.22 demonstrate, some
judges already analyze the likelihood of new entry with considerable so-
phistication.23 Moreover, entry is not the only question in merger analysis
that requires careful economic analysis. Market definition, coordinated ef-
fects, and efficiencies also call for it, and in several recent opinions, courts
have shown that they can produce detailed, economically sensitive analyses
17 Professor Waller suggested to us that the courts have been conducting a "drive by" analysis of
entry. Professor Carstensen commented that the courts simply "touch this base" on their way to a con-
clusion.
18 See Memorandum from Jonathan B. Baker & M. Howard Morse, Co-Chairs, Econ. Evidence
Task Force of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law on the Effectiveness of Economic Evidence in
Antitrust Proceedings to Officers and Council 3-4 (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/at-reports/01-c-ii.pdf (stating that most judges "have little background in economics or
antitrust" and "rarely see antitrust cases").
19 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 941 e, at 196 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter
4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP].
20 605 F. Supp. 2d 26,46-60 (D.D.C. 2009).
21 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170-71 (D.D.C. 2000).
22 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1086-88 (D.D.C. 1997).
23 See also Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 427-39 (5th Cir. 2008) (including an
extensive and thoughtful discussion of entry, although focused on sufficiency, not likelihood).
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of these issues.24 Finally, it is not possible to tell whether most judges can
handle a more rigorous approach to entry until a straightforward and practi-
cal approach is laid out for them, as we do in this Article.25
Under our approach, the litigation of the entry question would be bro-
ken into two steps. First, if defendants contend that new entry would solve
the merger's competitive problems, they would have to identify a "path to
profitability"-a business strategy that is likely to enable a new entrant (1)
to attain enough sales to make its investment in the market profitable and
(2) to grow at a sufficient rate that its output would drive prices and other
terms of sale back to the premerger level reasonably quickly.26 Second, if
the defendants introduce substantial evidence of a path to profitability, the
government could nevertheless prevail by demonstrating that the path is not
viable: barriers to entering the relevant market are so high that new entry
would not in fact satisfy all the Guidelines' criteria.27 This new approach
would improve the quality of entry analysis without rendering it unwork-
able. In summing up the state of antitrust law, Posner observed: "The anti-
trust laws are here to stay, and the practical question is how to administer
them better-more rationally, more accurately, more expeditiously, more
efficiently. 28 Our proposal would advance that goal.
In Part I, we summarize the entry section of the 1992 Merger Guide-
lines and two important features of the economic literature on entry: the
debate over the definition of an entry barrier and the empirical evidence on
24 See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (efficiencies); United States
v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1158-65 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (market definition); FTC v. Arch
Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 130-31 (D.D.C.) (coordinated effects), voluntarily dismissed, Nos. 04-
5291, 04-7120, 2004 WL 2066879, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004) (per curiam). This is not to say, of
course, that all these cases were correctly decided.
25 The 1992 Guidelines contain the essential economic theory, but they are terse and do not pro-
vide a concrete guide to applying the relevant economic principles to the most difficult entry issue-
likelihood. In 2006, the enforcement agencies issued a lengthy commentary on the Guidelines. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(March 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuide
linesMarch2006.pdf [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. While this document makes it easier to use the Guide-
lines, its aim is to provide "an explication of how the Agencies apply the Guidelines in particular inves-
tigations," not to propose a methodology for litigating the entry issue in court. See Deborah Platt Majo-
ras & Thomas 0. Barnett, Forward to id. at v.
26 To illustrate the level of detail required, we set forth a hypothetical example of a path to profit-
ability in Appendix B infra. See also Salop, supra note 15, at 567-69 (calculating an entrant's minimum
viable scale); Malcolm B. Coate, Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis, 4 REV.
L. & ECON. 183, 209 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol4/issl/artl 0 (expressing sur-
prise that FTC economists have not modeled the profitability of entry more often, since "entry is simply
an investment decision," all the steps involved in the decision can be modeled, and if "entry appears
profitable under a range of assumptions, economically it is likely to occur").
27 In accord with United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the govem-
ment would retain the ultimate burden of proof on the entry issue. See id. at 989-92.
28 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at x (2d ed. 2001).
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entry barriers. In Part II, we turn to judicial analysis of entry since the 1992
Guidelines, presenting a statistical summary of the thirty-five decisions
issued since April 1992 and an evaluation of the courts' substantive reason-
ing. In Part III, we explain our proposal for structuring entry analysis in
future cases.
I. ENTRY ANALYSIS IN THE GUIDELINES AND THE ECONOMIC
LITERATURE
The analytical tools for analyzing the entry issue can be found in the
1992 Guidelines and the economics literature. 29 In this Part of the Article,
we review the entry section of the 1992 Guidelines and two central features
of the economics literature on entry-the scholarly debate over the proper
definition of an entry barrier and the empirical evidence on entry. We dis-
cuss other insights from the economics literature as we address specific
entry questions.
A. 1992 Merger Guidelines
The enforcement agencies drafted the 1992 Guidelines in the wake of
two appellate decisions that dismissed Justice Department merger chal-
lenges on the ground that entry was easy-United States v. Baker Hughes,
Inc."° and United States v. Syufy Enterprises.3 In each case, the court chided
the Justice Department for failing to follow the entry analysis in its 1984
Guidelines.32 In part, the criticism was valid: the Justice Department had
refined its approach to entry since the 1984 Guidelines but had not revised
the Guidelines to reflect this new approach. The 1984 Guidelines devoted
only two paragraphs to entry and enunciated only a single, overarching test:
"if entry into a market is so easy that existing competitors could not suc-
ceed in raising price for any significant period of time, the Department is
29 For extended discussions of entry in the legal literature, see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT
HOvENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION 420-23 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter 2B AREEDA-HOVENKAMP]; 4 AREEDA-
HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 441; ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK:
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 119-39 (2005) [hereinafter ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK].
30 908 F.2d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
31 903 F.2d 659, 664-69 (9th Cir. 1990).
32 See Baker, supra note 15, at 190-91 ("Both appellate courts had sharply criticized the Justice
Department's entry arguments and the Department's seeming lack of fidelity to the 1984 Merger Guide-
lines, which were then in force.").
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unlikely to challenge mergers in that market."33 In a footnote, the 1984
Guidelines identified four factors that affect the ease of entry: sunk costs,
market growth, specialized resources, and economies of scale.34 But the
1984 Guidelines did not explain what the Department later came to be-
lieve-that entry would not solve the competitive problem posed by a
merger unless it met three distinct criteria: timeliness, likelihood, and suffi-
ciency.35
The agencies incorporated these new criteria into the Guidelines issued
in April 1992. As a result, the 1992 Guidelines contained a much longer
discussion of entry than the 1984 Guidelines-thirteen paragraphs rather
than two. The 1992 Guidelines also advanced the analysis of entry by dis-
tinguishing between "uncommitted" entry and "committed" entry.36 Un-
committed entry "must be likely to occur within one year and without the
expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry and exit."37 Firms that are
likely to enter the relevant market in less than a year without incurring sig-
nificant sunk costs are treated as participants in the market.38 In contrast,
committed entry requires the "expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry
and exit."39 Firms that need to incur significant sunk costs in order to enter
the relevant market are treated as potential entrants.4 ° In order to determine
whether committed entry is so easy that an otherwise anticompetitive
merger should not be challenged, the 1992 Guidelines stated that entry must
pass the tests of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency.4'
33 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,103, § Ill(B), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/1 1249.pdf.
34 Id. § Il(B) n.34.
35 See id. § Ill(B); see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. In addition, the 1984
Guidelines did not describe how to apply the factors they did list. Writing in 1986, Professor Salop
commented: "In fact, what is surprising is how little attention the DOJ Guidelines now pay to either
measurement of entry barriers or gradations in ease of entry." Salop, supra note 15, at 553 n.2.
36 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, §§ 1.32, 3.0.
37 Id. § 1.32.
38 Id.
39 Id. § 3.0.
40 See id. §§ 3.0-.1. Under the 1992 Guidelines, therefore, only committed entry is addressed in
the second or entry phase of merger analysis. Uncommitted entry is considered in the first phase: after
the market is defined, uncommitted entry is examined in deciding which firms are likely to be partici-
pants in this market. It might be more efficient and less confusing to address both issues in the entry
phase.
41 Id. § 3.0 ("In markets where entry is that easy (i.e., where entry passes these tests of timeliness,
likelihood, and sufficiency), the merger raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further
analysis.").
[VOL. 17:1
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1. Timeliness
The timeliness test asks whether new entry would eliminate the
merger's anticompetitive effects within a reasonably short period of time.4 2
According to the 1992 Guidelines, the government generally considers two
years to be an acceptably short period of time: "The Agency generally will
consider timely only those committed entry alternatives that can be
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market im-
pact."43
2. Likelihood
The likelihood test asks whether entry is probable. The Guidelines as-
sume that entry is probable if it would be profitable.44 In particular, they
state that committed entry (i.e., entry that requires significant sunk costs) is
likely to occur if it would be profitable at "premerger market prices over the
long-term."45 Premerger market prices are the appropriate benchmark be-
cause if entry is not significant enough to drive prices back to the premerger
level, it would not meet the Guidelines' test of sufficiency.4 6 Profitability
42 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, §§ 3.0, 3.2.
41 Id. § 3.2.
44 Id. § 3.3 ("An entry alternative is likely if it would be profitable. ). The Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise agrees that the likelihood of entry depends on its profitability: "Obviously, entry is
not likely to occur unless it is profitable to the entrant." 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 941,
at 210. This assumes, however, that entrants are always rational and well-informed, and recent behav-
ioral economics research suggests this is not so. Reviewing this research, Avishalom Tor concludes that
a great deal of much small-scale entry takes place even though, by any objective measure, the entrant's
expected profits are negative. See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market
Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 490 (2002) ("The empirical evidence strongly
suggests that negative net present value entry is commonplace."). On the other hand, most of this small-
scale entry does not affect incumbents' prices. See infra note 60. It is probably still the case, therefore,
that large-scale entry-entry sufficient to reduce incumbents' prices-is unlikely to occur unless it is
profitable. Tor did not cite any evidence to the contrary, and economic theory indicates that firms are
unlikely to make substantial sunk investments in a new market unless they expect a payoff.
As Professor Stucke has emphasized, behavioral economics also raises doubts about whether firms
will enter a market even when entry would be profitable. See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists
at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 515-16 (2007). As he
recognizes, though, such doubts need to be empirically validated before they can form a basis for anti-
trust policy, and he calls for retrospective evaluations of mergers in order to provide the necessary
information. Id. at 516. At present, it seems appropriate to presume, subject to possible rebuttal, that if
entry is a profitable investment opportunity, some firm will seize it.
45 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.0.
46 See id. ("Entry that is sufficient to counteract the competitive effects of concern will cause
prices to fall to their premerger levels or lower.") At this point, the Guidelines combine the sufficiency
and likelihood criteria into a single test: in order to determine whether entry is likely, the Guidelines ask
whether sufficient entry is likely. At other points, the Guidelines treat the sufficiency and likelihood
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must be evaluated over the long term because only "committed entrants"
are considered in the entry section of the Guidelines and the Guidelines
assume that their "assets will be committed to the market until they are
economically depreciated."47
The Guidelines recognize that the profitability of entry depends not
only on the prices the entrant can charge but on the volume of business it
can capture. In their overview to the entry section, the Guidelines state that
the "likely sales opportunities available to entrants" include the "output
reduction caused by the merger."48 In fact, the merged firm or another in-
cumbent could respond aggressively to entry, promptly eliminating much or
all of the merger-induced output reduction and preventing the entrant from
capturing it. In their later discussion of the likelihood criterion, the Guide-
lines acknowledge this possibility, noting that one factor that may reduce
the sales opportunities of an entrant is "any anticipated sales expansion by
incumbents in reaction to entry. 49
The Guidelines also recognize that the scale of entry matters. The en-
trant may enter at such a large scale that it depresses the market price below
the premerger level, rendering the entry attempt unprofitable. ° To address
this issue, as well as articulate a general test for the likelihood of entry, the
Guidelines use the concept of "minimum viable scale"-the "smallest aver-
age annual level of sales that the committed entrant must persistently
achieve for profitability at premerger prices."'" Under the Guidelines, "en-
try is unlikely if the minimum viable scale is larger than the likely sales
opportunity available to entrants."52 Conversely, entry is likely to occur if
criteria as separate tests. See, e.g., id. ("Entry may not be sufficient, even though timely and likely
...."). In their recent commentary on the Guidelines, the agencies follow a superior approach by com-
bining all three criteria into a single, unified test. In evaluating the likelihood of entry, the agencies state
that they "do not assess merely whether firms could commit incremental resources to the relevant mar-
ket, but more importantly whether the proposed merger would be likely to induce firms to do so in a
timely fashion and in a sufficient magnitude to deter or counteract the merger's anticompetitive effects."
COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 38.
47 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.0.
48 Id.
49 Id. § 3.3.
50 Id. ("The committed entrant will be unable to secure prices at premerger levels if its output is
too large for the market to absorb without depressing prices further."). Professors Baker and Shapiro
describe this effect as "the basis for the entry 'likelihood' analysis in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines." Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON
U.S. ANTITRUST 235, 270 n.37 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
51 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3.
52 Id. The concept of minimum viable scale was developed by Professor Salop. See Salop, supra
note 15, at 563. His version of it, however, assumed that prices in the relevant market would remain 5
percent above the premerger level. That is, he calculated the minimum volume of sales that would be
profitable for the entrant assuming that prices would not fall in response to entry. See id. Under that
assumption, though, entry would be insufficient to eliminate the merger's anticompetitive effects. As a
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the entrant is likely to capture enough sales to achieve minimum viable
scale.
In order to assess the likelihood of entry, therefore, the Guidelines
compare the entrant's minimum viable scale to its probable sales opportuni-
ties. At this point, however, the utility of the Guidelines diminishes. They
list several factors that may influence an entrant's likely sales opportunities,
but do not articulate a methodology for measuring those factors in a particu-
lar case. For example, the Guidelines note that an entrant's business pros-
pects depend in part on its "ability securely to divert sales from incum-
bents."53 They do not explain, though, how to determine an entrant's ability
to divert sales to itself in a specific market. Although they identify strate-
gies an entrant could use to capture business ("vertical integration or...
forward contracting" 4), they do not provide criteria for assessing the prob-
able success of those strategies. Similarly, the Guidelines indicate that an
entrant's sales opportunities depend on the reactions of incumbents to entry:
the entrant's sales will be larger if there is a "contraction in incumbents'
output in response to entry," and they will be smaller if there is a "sales
expansion by incumbents in reaction to entry."" The Guidelines do not de-
scribe, however, how to determine whether incumbents are more likely to
expand or contract output after entry.
3. Sufficiency
The sufficiency test asks whether new entry would be adequate to
eliminate the merger's anticompetitive effects.56 To determine this, the
Guidelines indicate that sufficiency must be evaluated along three dimen-
sions: "magnitude, character and scope."57 Entry would be insufficient in
magnitude if the entrant would not achieve enough sales to "return market
prices to their premerger levels."58 Entry would be insufficient in character
and scope if the entrant's products are not similar enough to the merged
firm's products to prevent the merged firm from imposing a significant
anticompetitive price increase. 9 The Guidelines add that whenever entry is
result, the Guidelines determine minimum viable scale at "premerger prices." MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 13, § 3.3.
53 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3.
54 Id.
55 id.
56 Id. § 3.0.
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.4 ("[E]ntry, in order to be sufficient, must involve
a product so close to the products of the merging firms that the merged firm will be unable to internalize
enough of the sales loss due to the price rise, rendering the price increase unprofitable.").
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likely, it will usually be sufficient because "multiple entry generally is pos-
sible and individual entrants may flexibly choose their scale."6
The Guidelines analyze the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of
entry without ever referring to entry barriers, the concept the courts always
use in assessing the difficulty of entry. Professor Baker, who was heavily
involved in drafting the 1992 Guidelines, indicates that this omission was
deliberate. By 1992, he notes, the "game theory revolution in microeco-
nomics was well underway, and economists had begun to look at entry de-
terrence in strategic terms, rather than in terms of barriers with height that
could be assessed in the abstract."6 As a result, the Guidelines view the
entry process as a game or contest between the entrant and the incumbents,
in which the success of the entrant-its profitability--depends on its behav-
ior, the reactions of the incumbents, and the responses of customers.62
While this strategic approach does not eliminate the need to address the
obstacles an entrant faces, it has several advantages: it makes clear that the
profitability of entry depends on the entrant's interactions with incumbents
and customers; it focuses the inquiry on the ultimate issue, the profitability
of entry; and it allows the government to discuss entry in the Guidelines
without resolving the debate, discussed below, over the proper definition of
an entry barrier.
60 Id. The Guidelines may well be correct that if any entry is likely, sufficient entry is likely. If it
is profitable for one small firm to enter the relevant market, for example, it may well be profitable for
other small firms to enter, and that may remain the case until enough firms have entered the market to
drive prices back to the premerger level. It would not be correct, however, to say that the typical entrant
is a sufficient entrant, large enough to affect market prices. After reviewing the empirical literature,
Geroski concludes that most entrants are small and disappear quickly: "Perhaps the most striking thing
that we know about entry is that small-scale, de novo entry seems to be relatively common in most
industries, but that small-scale, de novo entrants generally have a rather short life expectancy." P.A.
Geroski, "hat Do We Know About Entry?, 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 421, 435 (1995); see also Tor,
supra note 44, at 491 ("These findings of high mortality and low penetration also suggest that most
entrants simply displace preceding ones rather than diminish the market share of incumbents .... "). As
a result, most entrants do not provoke a response from incumbents. Geroski, supra, at 432, 436; accord
Tor, supra note 44, at 548 ("Most startups, and small entrants generally, pose no short-term competitive
threat to incumbents."); id. at 555 n.300 ("The empirical data on incumbents' responses to entry are
mixed, suggesting that they tend to ignore entry on most occasions, but may engage in various entry
deterring strategies-most notably by increasing advertising and typically not by lowering prices-in
specific cases."). The typical entrant, in short, is too small and exits too rapidly to have a significant
impact on market prices.
61 Baker, supra note 15, at 190.
62 See id. at 195 ("The economic logic of strategic entry deterrence lies behind the Guidelines'
analysis of the 'likelihood' of entry.").
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B. Economic Literature
Had the courts looked to the economic literature for tools to analyze
the entry issue, they would have found competing definitions of an entry
barrier and limited empirical evidence on entry. Although the leading eco-
nomic definitions of an entry barrier were formulated almost forty years
ago, they remain controversial to this day. While most economists appear to
prefer George J. Stigler's definition, the enforcement agencies and the
courts have not endorsed any definition and take an approach that more
closely follows Joe S. Bain's definition than Stigler's. The empirical litera-
ture on entry is of limited utility. Although it does identify market features
such as product differentiation that are likely to impede substantial entry, it
does not directly examine the responsiveness of entry to a postmerger price
increase and does not yield concrete criteria that courts could use to predict
the likelihood of effective entry.
1. The Debate Over the Definition of an Entry Barrier
In 1956, Bain wrote that the "condition of entry" could be "evaluated
roughly by the advantages of established sellers in an industry over poten-
tial entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the extent to which
established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive
level without attracting new firms to enter the industry."63 Under this defini-
tion, an entry barrier has two attributes: (1) it is an advantage possessed by
established sellers over potential entrants, and (2) it enables the established
sellers to persistently charge prices above the competitive level. Subsequent
commentary has largely, if not completely, dropped the first component,
turning Bain's definition into a simple performance test. Under this test,
any feature of the market that would block entry for a significant period of
time and allow incumbents to engage in supracompetitive pricing during
that period is an entry barrier, even if that feature would not give incum-
bents a cost advantage over entrants. Following this shortened version, the
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise defines an entry barrier as "any factor that
permits firms already in the market to earn returns above the competitive
level while deterring outsiders from entering."'
In contrast to this performance test, Stigler created a cost advantage
test by eliminating the second component of Bain's definition and sharpen-
ing the first. Under Stigler's definition, an entry barrier is "a cost of produc-
ing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which
63 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 3 (1956) (emphasis omitted).
64 2B AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, T 420a, at 71 (citing BAIN, supra note 63).
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seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the indus-
try."65 This cost advantage test has considerable appeal because it provides
a straightforward explanation of how an established firm could charge su-
pracompetitive prices for an extended period of time. If the established firm
has lower costs than potential entrants, it can price above its costs with little
or no risk of inducing entry simply by pricing below the costs of potential
entrants.66 Many economists believe, moreover, that a significant cost ad-
vantage is not only sufficient to deter entry, but necessary. If that view is
correct, then no barrier to entry would satisfy Bain's test unless it also met
Stigler's test.67 The leading antitrust economics textbook endorses this view
and advocates a Stiglerian definition of a long-run barrier to entry: "Be-
cause long-run profits can only persist if a firm has an advantage over po-
tential entrants, a logical definition of a long-run barrier to entry is a cost
that must be incurred by a new entrant that incumbents do not (or have not
had to) bear."6
65 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
66 In this situation, a rational, profit-maximizing potential entrant is highly unlikely to enter the
market, even though the established firm is exercising market power, because (1) the potential entrant
could not recover its costs at the price the established firm is charging and (2) even if the established
firm were to raise its price in order to accommodate entry (an unlikely scenario given the established
firm's cost advantage), the entrant could be driven out of the market whenever the established firm
decided to compete aggressively.
67 In this Article, we do not attempt to determine whether that view is correct. Two possible ex-
ceptions are large economies of scale and deep price cutting. Both might conceivably deter entry in the
face of an anticompetitive price increase even if the incumbent has no cost advantage over the entrant in
producing products, attracting customers, or obtaining financing. Resolving this issue, however, would
require mathematical modeling or game-theoretic simulation that is beyond the scope of this Article.
Moreover, the issue need not be resolved in order to implement our proposed approach. Under it, the
government would remain free to prove, if it could, that the relevant market is protected by a barrier that
satisfies Bain's definition but not Stigler's.
68 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 77 (4th
ed. 2005) (emphasis omitted). Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff define a short ron barrier to
entry as "anything that prevents an entrepreneur from instantaneously creating a new firm in a market."
See id. at 76, 780. McAfee, Mialon, and Williams also distinguish between barriers that delay entry,
which they call "antitrust" barriers, and those that permit longer-term economic harm, which they call
"economic" barriers. Like Carlton and Perloff, they define a longer-term or "economic" barrier in
Stiglerian terms. After reviewing the shortcomings and inconsistencies of prior definitions, they state:
To clear up the confusion, we offer the following new classification of entry barriers.... An
economic barrier to entry is a cost that must be incurred by a new entrant and that incum-
bents do not or have not had to incur.... An antitrust barrier to entry is a cost that delays en-
try and thereby reduces social welfare relative to immediate but equally costly entry.
R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, What Is a Barrier to Entry?, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 461, 463 (2004) (definition numbers omitted).
Both sets of economists distinguish short-run from long-run barriers to entry because it takes time to
create a new firm. During the time an entrant is setting up, the incumbents may be able to charge supra-
competitive prices even though they could not do so in the long run. As Carlton notes,
[t]he usual discussions of barriers to entry typically focus on the long run and ignore adjust-
ment costs.... But as a practical matter, the long run may be of little if any interest. It may
take so long to get there that the persistence of supracompetitive profits. . . turns out to be
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In the antitrust community as a whole, however, Bain's definition of
an entry barrier seems to be prevailing over Stigler's test. A recent mono-
graph of the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section ("Antitrust Sec-
tion") stated: "The courts, antitrust agencies, and most economists use a
definition that aligns more closely with Bain than with Stigler."69 Our re-
search indicates that this assessment is probably two-thirds correct: it is
accurate for the courts and the federal agencies, but not for many econo-
mists. Although only one of the decisions we reviewed contains a definition
of an entry barrier, neither that definition nor any other decision implies
that only a cost advantage would create an entry barrier.7" Rather, as noted
above, the courts generally view an entry barrier as any market characteris-
tic that reduces the speed, probability, or impact of entry-a concept that
accords most closely with Bain's view. Likewise, while the Guidelines do
not refer to entry barriers, the enforcement agencies have not indicated that
only a cost advantage will obstruct entry, either in their Guidelines or their
recent commentary on the Guidelines.7' In contrast, many economists have
not adopted Bain's definition. As mentioned earlier, both the leading indus-
trial organization text and a major recent article on entry barriers advocate
Stiglerian definitions of a long-run barrier.72 The economics article also
declares that there is no general consensus among economists on the proper
definition.73 It appears, therefore, that the controversy still lingers in the
economics profession. It is also reflected in the Areeda-Hovenkamp trea-
tise. In its discussion of basic antitrust economics, the treatise defines an
entry barrier citing Bain.74 In its discussion of horizontal mergers, however,
it offers a narrower definition that requires either blockaded entry or a
the fact of practical importance, not that these excess profits.., will be eliminated in some
far-off future year.
Dennis W. Carlton, Barriers to Entry, in I ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 601, 605 (2008)
[hereinafter Carlton, Barriers to Entry]. Another reason for the distinction is that in the short run, the
sunk costs incurred by incumbents for capital assets such as plants and advertising would not affect their
profit-maximizing response to new entry. Since these costs are already committed, they would be irrele-
vant to whether an aggressive reaction such as a deep price cut made sense. In the long rn, however,
firms can vary their capital investments. As a result, the ability of a firm to build plants or create other
assets at lower costs than entrants would influence its ability to exercise market power over the long run.
69 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 123.
70 See infra text accompanying notes 182-83 (quoting the court's definition and explaining that it
allows either Stigler's approach or Bain's approach to be used in identifying an entry barrier).
71 Their commentary notes that a cost advantage may be sufficient to deter entry: "A merger may
lead to price increases but not attract entry because entrants would suffer a significant cost disadvantage
relative to incumbents." COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 45. The agencies never assert, however, that a
cost advantage is necessary to deter entry.
72 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
73 McAfee, Mialon & Williams, supra note 68, at 465 ("Unfortunately, economists have not yet
been able to reach broad consensus over the definition of an entry barrier . ); accord Coate, supra
note 26, at 183 ("[A] consensus definition has eluded economists.").
74 See supra note 64.
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Stiglerian cost asymmetry: "Entry barriers are any factors that either block
entry altogether or raise new entrants' costs above those of existing effi-
cient firms. 75
Our proposed approach would employ the courts' concept of an entry
barrier. Any market characteristic would count as an entry barrier if it
would lessen the likelihood that new entry would promptly counteract an
anticompetitive postmerger price increase. Of course, if defendants claim
that entry is easy, the government could not prevail on the entry issue
merely by identifying such a barrier, since the barrier might make entry less
likely without making it unlikely. The government would also have to show
that the barrier or barriers that protect the relevant market are high enough
that new entry would be unlikely to defeat a significant anticompetitive
price in a reasonably short period of time. While the government could
make such a showing most easily by identifying a substantial Stiglerian
barrier, if the government was able to prove that some other obstacle would
satisfy the test just described, it could rely on such a barrier.76
2. Empirical Studies
It might be possible to decide which of these competing approaches to
the entry issue is correct-the courts' simple approach, the Guidelines'
more sophisticated approach, or Bain's or Stigler's definition-if there
were empirical evidence on point, but it appears there is not. We could not
find any empirical study of the responsiveness of entry to an anticompeti-
tive postmerger price increase. 7 Instead, the empirical literature examines
75 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 941 a, at 189.
76 Carlton argues that in many antitrust and regulatory proceedings, analysts should not focus on
either Bain's or Stigler's definition of an entry barrier, since both definitions are concerned with long-
run equilibrium, but on the likely behavior of the industry over the next few years:
[E]ntry barriers are concerned with the long run, yet the long run may not be relevant for an-
titrust or regulatory proceedings. What often matters for antitrust and regulation is not what
might happen in some year far off in the future, but what will actually happen now and in the
relatively near future. Rather than focusing on whether an entry barrier exists according to
some definition, analysts should explain how the industry will behave over the next several
years.
Carlton, Barriers to Entry, supra note 68, at 615. Our approach, like that of the Guidelines and the
courts, is consistent with Carlton's recommendation because it asks whether new entry is likely to
eliminate a merger's anticompetitive effects in the near future, not the long run.
77 There is a similar and puzzling gap in the price fixing area. Professor Stucke points out that
"many industries ...were . . .susceptible to price-fixing, such as: turtles; low-priced carpets sold
throughout the United States; ... chain link fences; ... and residential roofing work," even though these
industries "appear on the surface to have moderate or low entry barriers." Stucke, supra note 44, at 565-
66 (footnotes omitted). It is not easy to explain why entry did not occur in response to the collusive
pricing in these cases, since as Professor Stucke notes, "there have not been any extensive studies of the
characteristics of these industries." Id. at 578. In some instances, of course, the answer may be simple:
the price increases were too small to be noticed or too short-lived to warrant an investment in entry. But
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entry more generally. One segment of this literature-the structure-
performance segment-identifies industries with persistently high profits
and asks which structural characteristics of those industries prevented new
entry from eroding the high profits.7" The other segment of the empirical
literature-the entry and exit pattern literature-looks at actual instances of
entry and exit and asks such questions as how often is entry successful and
what industry features encourage or discourage it.79
Bain made the first major contribution to the structure-performance
literature on entry. After a detailed investigation of twenty industries, Bain
concluded that high profits were more likely to persist in industries that
were both highly concentrated and protected by certain structural features
that he called entry barriers.8" The most important of these barriers, accord-
ing to Bain, were economies of scale, product differentiation, and capital
requirements.8 The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise states that Bain's work and
later studies showed that high barriers to entry permit firms in highly con-
centrated industries to earn higher profits: "Profits are higher for highly
concentrated industries with very high entry barriers than for highly con-
centrated industries with relatively low entry barriers."82 Although many of
these studies have subsequently been criticized,83 it is probably still true that
the structure-performance literature supports the view that high profits in an
where the collusion was significant and sustained, the puzzle cannot be resolved without more informa-
tion. Professor Stucke has called for the gathering of such information as part of a broad effort to im-
prove the empirical basis of antitrust enforcement. See Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism,
GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'Y, Jan. 2009, at 2, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id= 1323815. In the merger area, he would require the federal agencies to conduct retrospective
evaluations of transactions that were allowed to occur even though second requests had been issued. See
Stucke, supra note 44, at 579-82; see also Stucke, supra, at 6-11 (calling for retrospective reviews of
certain mergers in order to test whether the biases identified by behavioral economics impeded entry,
such as an irrational aversion to risk or organizational behavior that slows decision-making). Such
retrospective evaluations could make a substantial contribution to our understanding of entry barriers.
78 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
80 Bain, supra note 63, at 201 (finding that profit rates are higher in highly concentrated industries
with very high barriers).
81 Id. at 168-69 (summarizing the heights of the barriers in the industries studied). Bain also
considered a fourth type of entry barrier-absolute cost advantages-but concluded that those advan-
tages were "slight" in seventeen of the twenty industries studied. Id. at 168, 169 tbl.XIV. Bain's defini-
tion of an absolute cost advantage corresponds fairly closely to Stigler's general definition of an entry
barrier. See id. at 144 ("An absolute cost advantage exists if the prospective unit costs of production of
potential entrant firms are generally, and more or less at any common scale of operations, higher than
those of established firms.").
82 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 941a, at 189-90.
83 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 430 (3d ed. 1990) ("[Tihe positive association found in most studies between industry
profitability and seller concentration, at least for the United States, appears to have been spurious, a
construct of aggregating from the line of business to the industry level.").
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industry are more likely to endure when barriers such as scale economies,
production differentiation, and capital requirements are very high. 4
The other segment of the literature-the segment that focuses on ac-
tual entry-is less clear, largely because scale economies, product differen-
tiation, and capital requirements appear to have little effect on the fre-
quency of small scale entry. As we discuss in the following sections, how-
ever, the entry and exit pattern literature does seem to suggest that each of
these structural characteristics tends to discourage large, profit-eroding en-
try.85
a. Scale Economies
According to P.A. Geroski, a significant number of empirical studies
indicate that "scale economies inhibit entry in small, shrinking markets."86
After reviewing "[o]ver 70 empirical studies of entry and exit patterns,"87
John J. Siegfried and Laurie Beth Evans reach a more qualified conclusion:
"Overall the evidence on scale economies as a barrier to entry is quite con-
fusing. If any judgment can be drawn, it may be that scale economies have
little effect on entry, but do deter the large scale entry that is more likely to
enhance competition."88 While the conclusion that scale economies do not
deter small scale entry may seem surprising, as Professor Avishalom Tor
points out, there are "numerous studies indicating that small entrants enter
at suboptimal scale."89 Since these entrants have to expand in order to sur-
84 Despite their critique of the concentration-profitability studies, Scherer and Ross conclude:
"Statistical studies reveal that substantial differences in the profitability of firms exist both within and
between industries. These differences tend to persist for long periods of time, particularly where barri-
ers to entry are high." Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
85 Our discussion of the entry and exit pattern literature is based on three recent reviews of this
literature: Geroski, supra note 60; John J. Siegfried & Laurie Beth Evans, Empirical Studies of Entry
and Exit: A Survey of the Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 121 (1994); and Tor, supra note 44. For con-
venience, we contrast "small-scale" and "large-scale" entry, although what really matters, as the Guide-
lines make clear, is whether an entrant can rather quickly achieve enough scale to attain profitability and
erode the prices of incumbents. Based on his review of the empirical literature, Richard Caves suggests
that entry barriers also impede this dynamic process, making it difficult for firms that have entered small
to expand enough to be profitable. See Richard E. Caves, Industrial Organization and New Findings on
the Turnover and Mobility of Firms, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1947,1961 (1998).
86 Geroski, supra note 60, at 429.
87 Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 12 1.
88 Id. at 133-34 (footnote omitted).
89 Tor, supra note 44, at 496 n.55 (citing the collection of studies referenced in David B. Au-
dretsch & Michael Fritsch, Creative Destruction: Turbulence and Economic Growth in Germany, in
BEHAVIORAL NORMS, TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: STUDIES IN
SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 137, 139-40 & n.2 (Ernst Helmstadter & Mark Perlman eds., 1996)).
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vive, most of them fail.9" Siegfried and Evans' other conclusion is consis-
tent with Bain's finding: scale economies probably do discourage the large
scale entry that is most likely to force incumbents to become more competi-
tive.
b. Product Differentiation
The evidence on one major aspect of product differentiation-heavy
advertising-is broadly consistent with the evidence on scale economies.
Geroski concludes that there is significant empirical support for the view
that heavy advertising constitutes an "important" barrier to entry.9" He de-
clares that "there seems to be little doubt that heavy advertising makes entry
more difficult for many new firms. It is certainly the case that advertising
can inflate the fixed costs faced by entrants or second movers .... ""
Again, Siegfried and Evans offer a more nuanced conclusion, writing that
the "empirical results relating advertising intensity to entry" are "ambigu-
ous, '93 since advertising can also help entrants penetrate a market. They
qualify this conclusion, however, in two significant ways. First, they note:
"Marketing executives admit that the creation of product loyalty through
advertising is the strategy most frequently used to deter entry."94 Second,
they state: "Heavy advertising seems to deter large scale entry, as reflected
by entrant market shares."95 As with scale economies, therefore, the evi-
dence may well support the proposition that heavy advertising by incum-
bents tends to make large scale, price-depressing entry less likely.96
90 See supra note 56. Geroski suggests, therefore, that we think of entry barriers not as barriers to
"entry," but as barriers to "surviving long in a market." Geroski, supra note 60, at 436; accord Caves,
supra note 85, at 1961 ("[S]tructural factors long thought to limit entry to an industry now seem more to
limit successful entry .... ").
91 See Geroski, supra note 60, at 429.
92 Id. at 434.
93 Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 140.
94 Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
95 Id. at 140 (citation omitted).
96 One way in which heavy advertising by an established manufacturer may impede entry is by
inducing more retailers to carry and feature the manufacturer's brand. With more retailers competing to
sell the product, their margins are likely to be lower. In contrast, an entrant, whose product is less well
known, may not be able to advertise as effectively as an established firm, fewer retailers are likely to
carry its product, and those that do are likely to feel less pressure to discount it. Their gross margins, in
short, are likely to be larger. As a result, the entrant's costs of distribution-the gross margins of its
retailers-will be higher than those of the established firm. This is just one example of how an incum-
bent may possess a cost advantage over an entrant because the incumbent can induce its suppliers or
dealers to operate on lower margins than can an entrant. For a more general analysis of the impact of
"vertical competition" on horizontal market power, see Robert L. Steiner, Vertical Competition, Hori-
zontal Competition, and Market Power, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 251 (2008).
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A second major source of product differentiation is brand loyalty, the
preference of customers for a product they know over one they have never
tried. Both Geroski and Siegfried and Evans agree that the evidence indi-
cates that brand loyalty is an entry barrier, even under Stigler's restrictive
definition.97 Citing Geroski's own work, Siegfried and Evans write that "[a]
number of case studies . .. suggest that the order of entry affects equilib-
rium market share, and that the first entrant can develop product loyalty at
lower cost than subsequent entrants." 98 It appears, then, that many entrants
may face higher promotional and advertising costs than incumbents had to
incur when they entered, a cost asymmetry that could slow entry or defeat it
altogether.
c. Capital Requirements
The evidence on capital requirements appears to be less ambiguous.
As with advertising, Geroski states that a number of studies indicate that
"capital raising requirements" are an "important barrier[] to entry."99 Sieg-
fried and Evans concur: "The evidence suggests that if more capital were
required to build an efficient scale plant, entry would be slower." ' Neither
review explains why this is so, nor do they identify specific circumstances
in which capital requirements would make entry not only less likely, but
unlikely, despite supracompetitive pricing by incumbents.
Indeed, it appears that neither the entry and exit pattern literature nor
the structure-performance literature has yet identified bright-line tests for
determining when any of the three barriers would prevent entry from satis-
fying the Guidelines' criteria of timeliness, likelihood, or sufficiency. Al-
though both segments of the literature suggest that substantial scale econo-
mies, product differentiation, and capital requirements tend to impede mar-
ket-power-eroding entry, the likelihood that they would do so in a particular
case appears to depend on the facts of that case. Thus, the case-by-case
approach that the courts have taken to the entry issue appears to be consis-
tent with the empirical literature.
In general, however, the courts have not utilized the sophisticated ana-
lytical tools developed by the enforcement agencies and economists. Al-
though some decisions cite the Guidelines, no court determined the likeli-
hood of entry by employing the Guidelines' methodology for assessing the
profitability of entry. No court, moreover, quoted Bain's or Stigler's defini-
tion of an entry barrier nor referred to any of the empirical literature on
entry. As a result, while the courts' analysis of the timeliness and suffi-
97 See Geroski, supra note 60, at 437; Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 137.
98 Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 151 n.25.
99 Geroski, supra note 60, at 429.
100 Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 132.
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ciency of entry has usually been good, they have frequently failed to pro-
vide a rigorous or convincing analysis of the most difficult issue-the like-
lihood of entry.
II. ENTRY ANALYSIS IN COURT DECISIONS SINCE THE 1992 GUIDELINES
This Part begins with a statistical summary of the decisions we re-
viewed and then examines the substantive analysis of entry in these deci-
sions. We ask first whether the courts agreed in principle with the Guide-
lines criteria and then whether the courts correctly applied each of them.
A. Statistical Summary of Decisions
This summary specifies exactly which decisions we looked at and tal-
lies their results, noting how often the government won the case, how often
it prevailed on the entry issue, and how often district court findings on the
entry issue were overturned.
1. Description of Cases Reviewed
We examined every judicial decision since the 1992 Guidelines that
resolved a merger challenge litigated by the federal government. In particu-
lar, we reviewed all published opinions since April 1992 in which a court
decided whether or not to enjoin, preliminarily or permanently, a merger or
acquisition that was challenged by the Justice Department or the FTC but
not resolved by consent decree. As of this writing, there are thirty-five such
opinions involving twenty-eight contested merger challenges. 1'
2. Quantitative Results
The courts ultimately concluded that only thirteen out of the twenty-
eight challenged mergers were sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive that
101 In seven cases, a merger challenge produced both a district court and an appellate court opinion:
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2007), rev'd, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir.
2008); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir.
2001); FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Engelhard Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Ga. 1997), affd, 126 F.3d 1302
(11th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aft'd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th
Cir. 1995); and Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992), affd in part, revd
in part, 991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See infra App'x A (summarizing the results of all thirty-five
decisions).
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an injunction, preliminary or permanent, was warranted. In virtually all of
these cases, either the courts found or the parties conceded that new entry
would not deter or counteract the merger's anticompetitive effects." 2 In a
fourteenth case, an appellate court reversed a summary judgment for the
defendants,0 3 and a consent decree requiring the divestiture of the acquired
dairy was eventually entered.0 4 Counting this case as a government victory,
the government prevailed in fourteen out of the twenty-eight challenges or
50 percent of the time. Since April 1992, therefore, the government has lost
half its merger challenges, sometimes in a dispiriting string of defeats. 105
In the fourteen unsuccessful cases, ease of entry was never the pre-
dominant reason for the government's failure. Although many government
challenges were rejected in the prior decade on that ground,0 6 in the period
since the 1992 Guidelines the courts have never excused an otherwise an-
ticompetitive merger on the ground that entry was easy. 07 Instead, in all
fourteen cases the courts concluded that another consideration-frequently
market definition, sometimes anticompetitive effect-indicated that the
merger was not anticompetitive, and that consideration was invariably ex-
plored at significantly greater length than the entry issue. In all fourteen
cases, then, the entry analysis, to the extent it existed at all, was dicta. In
102 In one of the thirteen, Whole Foods, the appellate court overturned the denial of a preliminary
injunction without addressing the entry issue. See Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1032; see also id. at 1051
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (explaining that the determinative issue in the case was market definition).
103 United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850, 852 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'g No.
Civ.A. 03-206KSF, 2004 WL 2186215 (E.D. Ky. last filing Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished decision).
104 United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., No. Civ.A.6:03-206-KSF, 2007 WL 1200094, at *2
(E.D. Ky. last filing Mar. 23, 2007).
105 See infra App'x A (showing that from 2004 to 2007, the government lost four consecutive
attempts to enjoin a proposed merger: FTC v. Foster, No. CIV 07-352 .BACT, 2007 WL 1793441
(D.N.M. May 29, 2007); FTC v. Equitable Res., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 361 (W.D. Pa. 2007); United
States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d
109 (D.D.C.), voluntarily dismissed, Nos. No. 04-5291,04-7120, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15,
2004) (per curiam), while Dairy Farmers, the government's lone success during this period, involved a
previously consummated merger). In the mid-nineties, the government suffered seven defeats in a row,
four of them in hospital merger cases. See infra App'x A (showing the government lost in the following
cases: United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. But-
terworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'dper curiam without published opin-
ion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. FTC, 85 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 1996); FTC v.
Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993); and Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v.
FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992), affd in part, rev"d in part, 991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
106 See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States
v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 666-68 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d
976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). See also supra note 9 and accompany-
ing text.
107 Baker, supra note 15, at 201 (stating that after the 1992 Guidelines, the "enforcement agencies
no longer habitually los[t] merger challenges on grounds of ease of entry").
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four of these cases, there was no discussion of entry; in the other ten, entry
was found to be difficult in five and easy in five.
In contrast to its overall success rate, the government's success rate on
the entry issue was high. Courts resolved the entry issue in twenty-two of
the twenty-eight challenges, and the government prevailed in seventeen, a
success rate of 77 percent. The government was successful on the entry
issue in the twelve cases in which the courts both resolved the issue and
concluded that the merger was likely to be anticompetitive. In five other
cases, moreover, the district court agreed that entry was difficult.' District
court decisions were appealed in only seven of the twenty-eight merger
challenges, and in all five in which the district court resolved the entry is-
sue, its resolution was sustained, sometimes without comment but never
with reservations. In recent years, therefore, the appellate courts have cre-
ated no incentive for the district courts to expend greater effort on entry
analysis.° 9
The government's impressive success rate on the entry issue since
April 1992 may have been due in part to the quality of the 1992 Guidelines.
Their revised analysis of entry is both sophisticated and sensible, and as we
note below, no court disagreed in principle with any of the criteria they
announced. Nevertheless, relatively few courts mentioned the Guidelines'
criteria in their discussion of entry and no judge actually followed the
Guidelines' method for determining the likelihood of entry.
B. Judicial Application of the Guidelines Approach
In this section, we reach the core of the first Part of this Article, the
courts' substantive evaluation of entry since April 1992.
1. Agreement with the Three Criteria
Unlike Baker Hughes, judicial decisions since the 1992 Guidelines
have not criticized the government's tests for evaluating entry. None of the
thirty-five opinions expressed disagreement with any of the three new crite-
ria. No court, for example, disputed the proposition that entry cannot ab-
solve an otherwise anticompetitive acquisition unless it is likely to occur
within a reasonably short period of time. While the courts did not endorse
108 See infra App'x A (including the following cases: Arch Coal, H.J. Heinz, Butterworth Health,
Freeman Hosp., and Dr Pepper/Seven-Up). In these five, the appellate courts did not register any dis-
agreement, either because there was no appeal or because they did not discuss entry.
109 Nor has the Supreme Court, which has not issued a merits-based decision in a merger case since
1974. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 208, 345
n.2 (2005) (citing United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)).
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the Guidelines' presumptive measure of timeliness-two years-no judge
asserted that the speed of entry was irrelevant. Similarly, no opinion as-
serted that the likelihood of entry did not matter or that its sufficiency-its
ability to drive prices back to the premerger level-was beside the point.
Despite this broad agreement, the courts rarely analyzed the entry is-
sue by invoking the Guidelines' criteria. Of the thirty-five opinions re-
viewed for this Article, only one evaluated ease of entry by expressly exam-
ining each of the Guidelines' tests."' Every other opinion that addressed
entry did so by asking whether the relevant market was protected by entry
barriers. In emphasizing barriers, rather than the Guidelines criteria, the
courts echoed the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise, which analyzes the entry
issue in merger cases in terms of barriers, not the Guidelines criteria."' In
one respect, however, the courts departed from the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise. Every case that dealt with entry appeared to regard easy entry as a
complete defense, even if the transaction would create a highly concen-
trated market. In contrast, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise strongly suggests
that low barriers should not justify "mergers converting unconcentrated to
highly concentrated markets.""'2
The courts' broad agreement with the Guidelines' criteria extended to
their application of the timeliness test. While only four decisions evaluated
the speed of entry, they concurred with the Guidelines that timeliness is a
critical issue. In two other cases, the courts voiced no disagreement with the
criterion but neglected to apply it.
2. Judicial Analysis of Timeliness
Of the four decisions that determined the timeliness of entry, only one
adopted the Guidelines' two-year test. In United States v. Franklin Electric
Co., 113 the court found: "The various barriers to entry would enable [the
joint venture that would result from the merger] to control production and
sale for at least three years, if not longer.""' 4 Although the reference to three
years is consistent with the Guidelines' two-year test, the court did not en-
dorse that test."5 Instead, it cited the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise, not the
110 See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54-58 (D.D.C. 1998).
111 See 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 1 941, at 189-215.
112 Id. 941b, at 191. Later, the treatise adds an efficiencies qualification, stating that low barriers
should not be a defense when:
(a) the postmerger concentration is well above the indicated threshold of illegality; and (b)
the merger is not justified by qualifying efficiencies. In that case, all that can be said of the
merger is that, while producing little social good, its anticompetitive pricing effects will
likely be dissipated by new entry within two years.
Id. 941 c, at 193 (footnote omitted).
113 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
114 Id. at 1035.
115 See id.
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Guidelines, and articulated the standard for timely entry in general terms:
"Certainly, defendants have not shown that entry is so easy that [the joint
venture] could not sustain monopolist profits for some period of time."'' 6
Likewise, the court in FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc."7 reached a decision
that was consistent with the Guidelines' test but did not adopt it. The court
simply found that "a leased distribution center could open within as little as
90 days"" 8 and that many distribution centers would be "immediately avail-
able" after the merger because the parties planned to close many of their
existing warehouses when they consolidated their operations." 9 In United
States v. UPM-Kymmene Oyj, 2° the court diverged from the Guidelines in a
different way: it ruled that entry would be untimely because it would not
occur for at least a year.12" ' The court cited no authority, however, for the
view that one year is the proper period for measuring the speed of entry. In
contrast, in CCC Holdings Judge Collyer quoted the Guidelines' two-year
test and applied it.122
Two decisions overlooked the timeliness of entry. They found that en-
try would occur in response to a postmerger price increase, but did not ask
how long it would take to accomplish, even though there was evidence that
it might require a substantial period of time. In United States v. Oracle
Corp.,'23 the court found that Microsoft would enter the government's as-
serted market if the merged firm raised price. The court called such entry
"repositioning," since Microsoft already licensed software with similar but
less extensive functionality, and concluded that Microsoft would in fact
reposition in response to a price increase.'24 The court did not ask, however,
how much time it would take Microsoft to plan, write, and debug the more
elaborate software required, even though another firm had devoted ap-
116 Id. (emphasis added) (citing 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 1 91 lb, at 57 (stating that
defendants should have the burden of showing that monopoly profits could not be sustained "for any
significant length of time")).
117 12F. Supp. 2d34(D.D.C. 1998).
118 Id. at 56.
119 Id.
120 No. 03 C 2528, 2003 WL 21781902 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2003).
121 Id. at *10.
122 See FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 59 (D.D.C. 2009) ("According to the
Merger Guidelines, entry is 'timely' if it can be achieved 'within two years from initial planning to
significant market impact.' . . . Whatever Web-Est's plans and aspirations for the future may be, it is
very unlikely to be able to compete effectively, i.e., affect pricing, within five years or even soon there-
after." (quoting MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.2)). In Chicago Bridge, the Fifth Circuit noted
evidence that entry "cannot be achieved in a timely fashion," but did not resolve the issue or rest its
decision on that basis. See Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2008).
123 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
124 See id. at 1108-09. The court quoted a witness who contended that Microsoft was "almost
there" because it was considering acquiring the other major firm in the market (SAP). Id. at 1135. But
this interest in entry by acquisition did not show that Microsoft had the capacity to quickly enter de
novo.
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 63 2009-2010
GEO. MASON L. REv.
proximately ten years to an unsuccessful effort to penetrate the market.'25
Similarly, in United States v. Gillette Co.,'26 the judge found that "there are
new entrants . .. which are able to check increases in price.' 2 7 He did not
determine, however, how long it would take them to enter or grow large
enough to affect market prices, even though he had noted earlier in his
opinion that "it may take a significant investment of time.., to build mar-
ket share."'28
These two opinions aside, judicial analysis of the timeliness issue
broadly accorded with the Guidelines and economic theory. In contrast,
judicial evaluation of the likelihood of new entry-the most difficult entry
issue-typically failed to come to grips with the central questions posed by
the Guidelines and economic theory.
3. Judicial Analysis of Likelihood
In some cases, the courts did not address the likelihood issue at all.
Generally, they dealt with it relatively briefly and summarily, disposing of
it simply by identifying the existence of entry barriers without recognizing
that all markets have some barriers and the real question is their height.
This fundamental problem could have been avoided by following the
Guidelines approach, which focuses not on the existence of barriers, but on
the sales volume required for profitable entry, a focus that is integral to our
proposed approach to entry analysis. No court, however, attempted to de-
termine this volume and few decisions examined the profitability of entry.
a. Failure to Address the Issue
Three opinions ignored the likelihood issue altogether. Two of the
three found that entry barriers were low because new firms could enter the
relevant market without asking whether they would do so. The third ob-
served that the acquisition would increase barriers to entry, without deter-
mining whether the increased barriers would render entry unlikely. In addi-
tion, several other decisions effectively failed to address the likelihood is-
125 See id. at 1135-44. While Microsoft might have been able to develop the necessary functional-
ity in substantially less than a decade, the court did not address whether Microsoft could do so in the
reasonably short period of time required by the timeliness criterion. See id. at 1144.
126 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993).
127 Id. at85.
128 Id. In FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2007), rev 'd, 548 F.3d 1028
(D.C. Cir. 2008), the court cited evidence that new entry would take at least three years to accomplish.
Id. at 42-43. However, the court did not resolve the timeliness issue, apparently because the court was
virtually certain the government had misdefined the relevant market. See id. at 49-50 ("There is no
substantial likelihood that the FTC can prove its asserted product market .... ").
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sue, either because they gave no reasons for their conclusion or because
they mistakenly thought that entry would be unlikely simply because it
would be costly.
i. Issue Missed
In United States v. Mercy Health Services,'29 the court devoted just one
paragraph to entry, concluding that regional hospitals located outside the
government's proposed geographic market had the ability to enter it by
opening outreach clinics. 3 ° The court failed to address, however, whether
they were likely to do so.' 3' Likewise, in another one-paragraph analysis, the
court in Gillette concluded that "there are new entrants into the fountain pen
market which are able to check increases in price."'3 Although the court
acknowledged that an entrant may have to make "a significant investment
of time and money to build market share,"' 33 it did not examine whether
such an investment was likely to be profitable.'34 In Dr Pepper/Seven-Up
Cos. v. FTC,35 the judge failed to address the likelihood issue for a different
reason. He disposed of the entire entry question in a single sentence by ob-
serving that "the acquisition of the Seven-Up bottling franchise by the Pepsi
bottler would increase the barriers to entry to new bottlers .. .."36 He did
not address whether the increased barriers would render entry unprofitable.
ii. No Reasons for Conclusion
In FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.,37 the court's analysis of the only
likelihood issue in dispute was conclusory. The FTC challenged the merger
of the two largest hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and the usual likeli-
hood issue was uncontested: because of the state's "certificate of need"
laws, the defendants conceded that no new hospital was likely to be built in
129 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
130 Id. at 986; see infra text accompanying note 255 (quoting the paragraph in full).
131 id.
132 Gillette, 828 F. Supp. at 85 (emphasis added).
133 jd.
134 See id.; accord, Baker, supra note 12, at 371 ("The Gillette court treated entry in much the way
the D.C. Circuit did in Baker Hughes: it noted instances of actual entry, declared the technological,
legal, and regulatory barriers low, and allowed the merger. The court acknowledged that a significant
investment of time and mohey may have been required to build market share, but did not evaluate entry
likelihood in light of that observation.").
135 798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992), affid in part, rev 'd in part, 991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
136 Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
137 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd per curiam without published opinion, 121 F.3d
708 (6th Cir. 1997).
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the area.'38 The defendants argued, however, that the merged hospital would
still be unable to raise prices because if it did so, the two smaller hospitals
in the area, St. Mary's and Metropolitan, would respond by expanding the
range and quality of the services they offered, thereby undercutting any
increase.' 39 In concluding that such expansion was unlikely, the court dis-
missed the issue in a single sentence:
Considering the record as a whole, however, the Court finds that, due to the greater range of
services and the perceived higher quality of care available at defendant hospitals, St. Mary's
and Metropolitan's ability to compete with the merged entity and defeat a small but signifi-
cant price increase would be limited, especially for the foreseeable future.'
4 °
While this finding may be correct, the judge did not support it. He did not
explain why the smaller hospitals' ability to compete would be limited "for
the foreseeable future," even if the merged firm raised prices. In that event,
their incentive to invest in a greater range of services and a higher quality of
care would be enhanced.' 41
iii. Entry Unlikely Simply Because Costly
In three cases, courts failed to apply the likelihood criterion correctly
because they ruled that entry was unlikely simply because it was costly. As
a matter of economic theory, this is a mistake. Incumbents also have to in-
cur costs, and if they try to charge prices above those costs, they create an
incentive for entry. Unless there is a real barrier, an entrant can incur those
same costs and make profits by charging a price below that of the incum-
bents but above its own costs. The mere fact that entry is costly, therefore,
would not make it unlikely.
This mistake occurred in FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc.,'42 FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., "'43 and FTC v. Freeman Hospital.'" In Arch Coal, the district court re-
lied on a government expert to conclude that entry barriers existed, but in
explaining why the expert's testimony was credible, it offered only the fol-
lowing reason: "Certainly there are appreciable start-up costs associated
138 Id. at 1297.
139 Id. at 1297-98.
140 id.
141 Whether the smaller hospitals would make these investments is an expansion issue rather than
an entry issue, since the smaller hospitals were already in the relevant market. We mention the case,
however, because expansion and entry are analytically similar when expansion would require the com-
mitment of significant sunk costs.
142 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C.), voluntarily dismissed, Nos. 04-5291, 04-7120, 2004 WL
2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004) (per curiam).
143 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
144 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).
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with becoming a[] [Southern Powder River Basin] coal producer."'45 In
Heinz, the lower court made essentially the same argument: "The parties are
in agreement that the cost of entry is significant making entry difficult and
improbable."'46 In Freeman Hospital, the court stated that one of the entry
barriers facing potential entrants was the "high costs of constructing new or
refurbished medical facilities."'47 In all three cases, however, an entrant
might have been able to recover the costs in question if the incumbents'
prices were high enough. If the merged firm's prices significantly exceed an
entrant's average total costs, including the costs of entry, there may be a
profit opportunity, not a barrier.
These decisions moved too quickly from the fact that entry is costly to
the conclusion that it is unlikely. As we discussed earlier, though, there is
evidence that when the costs of entry are high, its speed, impact, or prob-
ability may be reduced. The empirical literature indicates, for example, that
large capital requirements tend to reduce the number of firms willing to
attempt entry. 48 As we also noted, however, this literature has not generated
any bright-line criteria for determining when the costs of entry are so high
that entry is unlikely to occur in response to an anticompetitive price in-
crease.'49 As a result, it is not possible to resolve the likelihood issue simply
be observing that entry is "costly." To determine whether entry sufficient to
restore premerger prices would be likely, it is usually necessary to assess
whether it would be profitable.
b. Common Shortcomings
Most opinions do not make the basic mistakes just described. Instead,
their discussions of the likelihood of entry generally identify true barriers as
courts understand the term-that is, obstacles that tend to make entry less
likely. They do not, however, typically measure the height of these obsta-
cles or otherwise ask enough of the right economic questions to determine
the profitability of entry.
i. No In-Depth Discussion
Most recent merger decisions do not devote much attention to the en-
try issue. While judges often write opinions of twenty pages or more-
14' Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2dat 138.
146 H.J. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
147 Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1223.
148 See supra Part l.B.2.c.
149 See id.; see also infra note 183 (indicating that high capital costs do not deter entry by large
diversified firms).
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sometimes much more-in order to resolve a government merger challenge,
they usually dispose of the entry issue in a page or less. In Arch Coal, for
example, the court issued a forty-seven-page decision denying the FTC's
motion for a preliminary injunction.' The court devoted four pages to
market definition, most of its attention to the likelihood of coordinated in-
teraction, and only two sentences to entry, 5 ' even though defendants had
apparently contested the issue. In FTC v. Libbey, Inc., the court dis-
patched the entry issue in two paragraphs of an eighteen-page decision. 53 In
Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp. ,154 the court took thirty-one
pages to analyze the case as a whole and three sentences to analyze entry.'55
In both FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. '56 and Mercy Health, the disputed
entry issue was resolved in a single paragraph.' In a third hospital merger
case, United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,' the judge
reached an unusual conclusion-that new hospitals were likely to enter the
government's proposed market-but devoted only two paragraphs to the
question.'59
In contrast, some opinions provided a more detailed, though still rela-
tively brief discussion of entry. In Oracle, the court devoted almost four
pages to the central entry issue in the case: whether Microsoft would enter
the government's proposed market by repositioning its software. 6' This
discussion, however, is only a small part of the court's unusually lengthy
opinion, which runs for almost seventy-seven pages and contains a thirty-
eight-page analysis of the relevant product market.' 6' Judge Hogan's much
more sophisticated evaluations of entry conditions are comparatively short,
occupying a little more than a page of his twenty-one-page Swedish Match
opinion'62 and two pages of his twenty-five-page Staples decision.'63 The
only exceptions, in which the entry discussion represents a substantial pro-
portion of the opinion, are CCC Holdings and Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.
150 See Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 114, 160.
1 Id. at 138, 140.
152 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
113 See id. at 40, 48.
114 892 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139
F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
155 Id. at 1168-69. The Eighth Circuit noted but did not discuss the district court's finding of high
barriers. See 139 F.3d at 1184.
156 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946-47 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
157 See id. at 946-47; United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 986 (N.D. Iowa
1995), vacatedas moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
158 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
159 See id. at149.
160 See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1135, 1143-44, 1160 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
161 Seeid. at1123-61.
162 See FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170-71 (D.D.C. 2000).
163 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1086-88 (D.D.C. 1997).
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v. FTC."64 In CCC Holdings, Judge Collyer's analysis of entry consumes
almost 30 percent of her decision. 65 In Chicago Bridge, the Fifth Circuit's
opinion is largely devoted to entry. 166 This decision is unique among those
we reviewed, however, because on appeal the defendant not only accepted
the FTC's definition of the relevant markets but failed to advance an effi-
ciencies defense, 67 leaving entry as the only major issue for the court to
resolve.
In a few cases, the court's analysis was brief because the entry issue
was easy to resolve. In Heinz, the district court devoted just one paragraph
to entry because the merging parties had agreed that entry would be "diffi-
cult and improbable."' 68 In Olin Corp. v. FTC,69 the Ninth Circuit never
analyzed the issue because the parties had apparently not appealed the
FTC's findings on entry. 7 In Tenet Healthcare, entry was almost certainly
precluded by the "state regulatory process,"'' which required a showing of
need "before opening a new hospital or increasing the bed capacity of an
existing hospital."'72 The court said "it is clear that no need exists for addi-
tional hospital services or beds in the Poplar Bluff area,"'73 since both of the
merging hospitals were licensed to operate many more beds than they nor-
mally filled.'74 In Community Publishers, the judge spent only three sen-
tences on entry because barriers to entry in major newspaper markets "are
universally recognized as formidable, as is supported by the fact that in the
entire nation every major city newspaper market is a monopoly except for
approximately eight."' 175
More commonly, however, the entry issue in a merger case is not easy
to resolve. As much of this Article indicates, it is usually difficult to predict
whether a new entrant can both make a profit and promptly defeat a price
increase. Several other commentators have also emphasized the difficulty of
the entry issue. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise declares: "Determining the
164 See FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 46-60 (D.D.C. 2009); Chi. Bridge & Iron
Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410,421-22,427-40 (5th Cir. 2008).
165 See CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp 2d at 46-60 (fourteen pages of a forty-seven-page opinion).
166 See Chi. Bridge, 534 F.3d at 421-22,427-30, 433-40.
167 Seeid. at421-22.
168 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
169 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993).
0 See id. at 1297.
171 FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946-47 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 186 F.3d
1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
172 Id. at 947.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 939-40. If the merger did cause a price increase, moreover, fewer patients would use
the merged hospitals, which would increase their excess capacity and further diminish the "need" for a
new hospital.
175 Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1168 (W.D. Ark. 1995), affd sub
nom. Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
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existence, 'height' and effects of entry barriers are beset with some theo-
retical difficulties and with empirical problems of seemingly formidable
proportions."'76 More than twenty years ago, Professor Richard Schmalen-
see offered the "depressing" conclusion that "economists do not have a
single, precise, reliable way of measuring ease of entry in particular mar-
kets."'' 77 Recently, the Antitrust Section's monograph on market power in-
dicated that Schmalensee's conclusion is still correct: "[T]here remains
significant disagreement over both the definition of entry barriers, and the
best method of evaluating the ease or difficulty with which a new competi-
tor will be able to enter a market."'' 78 The 1992 Guidelines, moreover, have
not eliminated these difficulties. While two of their criteria are relatively
easy to apply (timeliness and sufficiency), the third (likelihood) remains a
challenge, in part because the Guidelines' discussion of this test is terse,
identifying economically relevant factors but not describing how to apply
them.179 Even the FTC staff, which routinely applies the Guidelines in their
merger investigations, has frequently had trouble with the likelihood is-
sue. 180
In addition, the entry discussion is often dicta. In many cases, as noted,
district courts conclude that they can resolve the case against the govern-
ment on another ground, most often market definition.'' When that is so, it
is understandable that they do not want to invest much effort in the chal-
lenging questions of entry analysis. But that posture makes judicial review
more difficult-and the entry decision less reliable-whenever an appellate
176 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 94 Ib, at 191.
177 Richard Schmalensee, Ease of Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied Too Readily?, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 42 (1987). He added: "There is some agreement on what relevant factors one ought
to consider. But there is much less agreement about how to assess those factors, and even less about how
to combine them into an overall measure of the difficulty of entry." Id.
178 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 121.
179 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3. The relevant section of the Guidelines is just
three paragraphs long and contains no concrete examples. See id. The first paragraph briefly explains the
Guidelines' approach to determining the profitability of entry (compare the entrant's minimum viable
scale with its likely sales opportunities), the second briefly defines and describes minimum viable scale,
and the third lists factors affecting the entrant's sales opportunities. See id. One of the factors listed is
"any anticipated sales expansion by incumbents in reaction to entry." Id. As Professor Baker pointed
out, "the Guidelines offer no guide for thinking about how to adjust sales opportunities for the likely
output response of incumbents in reaction to merger and entry." Baker, supra note 15, at 205. As dis-
cussed, this is equally true of the other factors listed. Id. at 205 n.80; see also supra Part I.A.2. The
agencies' recent commentary on the Guidelines, however, should make them less difficult to apply. See
COMMENTARY, supra note 25.
180 Malcolm Coate reviewed 138 merger investigations conducted by the FTC staff between 1993
and 2005 and found that "the likelihood findings are less likely to exhibit a solid foundation." Coate,
supra note 26, at 197, 184. Coate judged that in half the investigations in which the staff concluded that
entry was unlikely, "the conclusion that entry would not pass the [Guidelines' minimum viable scale]
test was not supported in sufficient detail." Id. at 20 1.
181 See supra Part Il.A.2.
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court decides that the principal ground was erroneous. It would be prefer-
able if judges had a process that would make it easier for them to engage in
rigorous and reliable entry analysis.
ii. No Definition of Entry Barrier
Although every decision since April 1992 that analyzed the entry issue
asked whether the relevant market was protected by entry barriers, only one
court defined an entry barrier. In Chicago Bridge, the Fifth Circuit stated in
a footnote that entry barriers are "'additional long-run costs that were not
incurred by incumbent firms but must be incurred by new entrants,' or 'fac-
tors in the market that deter entry while permitting incumbent firms to earn
monopoly returns."" 82 This definition, which allows either Stigler's test or
Bain's test to be used in identifying an entry barrier, was not mentioned by
any other decision we reviewed. Instead, it appears that every other court
had a simpler concept in mind: a barrier is a feature of the market that re-
duces the likelihood, speed, or impact of entry. We employ this concept in
our proposed framework because most courts use it and it meshes with the
Guidelines' approach and Bain's definition. As we indicated earlier, how-
ever, it is not adequate by itself to resolve the entry issue. As Chicago
Bridge recognized, unless the height of such a barrier is assessed, it is not
possible to conclude that the barrier is likely to prevent new entry from
quickly eliminating the merger's anticompetitive effects.'83
iii. No Assessment of Height of Barriers
Despite the importance of the issue, few courts since April 1992 have
assessed the size or durability of the barriers they identified.'84 In Libbey,
182 Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 428 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting L.A. Land Co.
v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving non-merger antitrust claims)).
183 See id at 437 n. 17 ("The question is not whether there are barriers to entry, but rather whether
the barriers in a particular industry are large enough to trigger judicial concern." (quoting Steams Air-
port Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted))).
184 An entry barrier may affect either the costs of entry or the expected revenues from entry, since
the profitability of entry is a function of both. The profitability of entry might be high even though entry
is costly, because entry is likely to yield large revenues. Entry might be unprofitable, even though the
costs of entry are low, because the likely revenues are even lower. The failure to consider both costs and
revenues distorted the Court's analysis of entry in United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9th
Cir. 1990). See id. at 664-71. The Ninth Circuit concluded that entry could be accomplished at low cost
and that the Justice Department was relying on a "shopworn argument" that efficient, aggressive compe-
tition was a structural barrier to entry. Id. at 667. The government's argument, however, was not that
entry was expensive, but rather that it would be unprofitable, since entry at an efficient scale would
depress market prices and prevent the entrant from realizing sufficient revenues to cover its costs. See
id at 667-68.
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for example, the court identified a product differentiation barrier, noting
that a new entrant would "have to persuade distributers and other consum-
ers, most of which have already established relationships with an existing
food service glassware provider, to conduct business with it,"' 5 and to ac-
complish this, the entrant "would probably have to undercut the current
competitors in the market by selling its glassware at lower prices."' 86 The
court did not determine, however, the size of the price reduction a new en-
trant would have to offer or how long the price cut would have to remain in
effect in order to induce enough consumers to switch to make the entrant
viable. New entry might have been profitable if the required price cut were
small or could be offered for a short period of time." 7
In Cardinal Health, the judge identified two barriers to the expansion
of regional drug wholesalers: the economies of scale enjoyed by the na-
tional drug wholesalers and their "strength of reputation."'88 He did not
measure the height of either barrier, however, relying instead on the fact
that the regional wholesalers' expansion to date had been "insignificant on
a national scale."'8 9 But the failure of the regional wholesalers to achieve
significant national expansion was not dispositive, since they had been at-
In some cases, entry may be so costly that it would be beyond the reach of most firms. If the capital
requirements of entry are very large, in other words, the number of potential entrants may be small. That
may not mean, however, that new entry is unlikely, as McAfee, Mialon, and Williams point out:
Capital-market imperfections favor wealthier and more experienced firms over entrepreneurs
without track records, but the former are not necessarily the incumbents. Some entrants are
large diversified firms that build new plants in an industry.... In industries where the pri-
mary potential entrants are large diversified firms, large capital costs are not entry barriers.
McAfee, Mialon & Williams, supra note 68, at 464.
185 FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34,48 (D.D.C. 2002).
186 id.
187 A similar shortcoming appeared in United States v. Franklin Electric Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025
(W.D. Wis. 2000), where the court also found a product differentiation barrier, noting that the merging
firms' brands are "recognized names in the submersible turbine pump market," that customers "know
their reputation for product quality," and that product quality is important because a malfunction "stops
the dispensing of an entire grade of gasoline" and could even cause a "catastrophic explosion." Id. at
1031. Again, however, the court did not appraise the height of this barrier, even though there was evi-
dence that it was modest. See id. at 1031-32. One of the merging firms was started by a former em-
ployee of the other, who was bored during retirement and decided to enter the business on his own. Id. at
1027. Despite the incumbent firm's superior reputation, the new firm "made its first million dollar sale
of submersible pumps within its second full year of sales, at a time when its market share was almost too
small to measure." Id. at 1033.
Likewise, in Chicago Bridge the Fifth Circuit did not determine whether the reputation and experi-
ence barriers it identified would render entry unprofitable. See Chi. Bridge, 534 F.3d at 437-38. In
particular, the court did not ask whether an entrant could profitably overcome these barriers by offering
a temporary promotional discount that significantly undercut the supracompetitive prices charged by the
merged firm. See id. On the whole, however, Chicago Bridge is an exceptionally good opinion on entry,
containing much evidence and analysis indicating that new entry would not eliminate the merger's
anticompetitive effects.
188 FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 57 (D.D.C. 1998).
189 Id.
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tempting to expand during a period in which prices in the industry were
competitive. 9 The question that should have been resolved is whether, if
prices increased to anticompetitive levels after the challenged mergers, the
regional wholesalers would still find it unprofitable to expand.
In Staples, Judge Hogan relied on a single barrier to entry-economies
of scale. He noted that an entrant "would need to open a large number of
stores nationally in order to achieve the purchasing and distribution econo-
mies of scale enjoyed by the three existing firms."'' He also referred to
"[e]conomies of scale at the local level, such as in the costs of advertising
and distribution."'92 Judge Hogan did not quantify these economies, how-
ever, and thus did not actually calculate whether they were large enough to
render entry unlikely despite a significant anticompetitive price increase.
He did not determine (1) the volume of business an entrant would need to
attain in order to realize these economies, (2) the cost penalty it would incur
if it operated at a smaller scale, and (3) the likelihood that it would attain
the necessary volume, despite the cost penalty, by inducing a sufficient
number of customers to switch from the existing firms to the entrant. 193
The same problem occurred in two cases in which the courts con-
cluded that new entry was likely to defeat a postmerger price increase. In
Gillette, the court found that entry was easy even though "it may take a
significant investment of time and money to build market share."' 94 The
court did not determine, however, how much time or money it would take
to enter. In Oracle, the court cited testimony that entry into the govern-
ment's product market would entail considerable expense and risk, yet con-
cluded that entry would occur in response to a significant postmerger price
increase.'95 The court did not examine whether these costs and risks were so
great that entry would be unprofitable.'96
iv. No Estimate of Sales Volume Required for Profitable Entry
It is possible, of course, to evaluate the profitability of entry directly.
The Guidelines do this by estimating the entrant's minimum viable scale
and then determining whether the entrant's sales volume is likely to exceed
this minimum."' Despite the availability of this methodology, none of the
190 Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 226-28.
191 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1087 (D.D.C. 1997).
192 id.
193 See id. at 1086-88. Nevertheless, by citing an array of less quantitative evidence, Judge Hogan
made an impressive case that new entry was unlikely to undo the merger's anticompetitive effects. See
id. For additional discussion of Staples, see infra text accompanying notes 223-25, 240-42, and 307-09.
194 United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 84-85 (D.D.C. 1993).
195 See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1144-45, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
196 See id. at 1160; see infra text accompanying notes 199-208.
197 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3.
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thirty-five opinions issued since the 1992 Guidelines estimated the mini-
mum amount of business an entrant would need to be profitable.'98
Oracle is a particularly good example because the court discussed en-
try at unusual length without determining the volume of sales the most
likely entrant (Microsoft) would need to be profitable. The case involved a
challenge to Oracle's acquisition of PeopleSoft, which the judge rejected
principally because he found that the government's proposed product and
geographic markets were too narrow.' 99 In his entry analysis, he also con-
cluded that even if the government had correctly defined the relevant mar-
ket, Microsoft would enter it if the merged firm raised prices signifi-
cantly."' 0 In reaching this conclusion, the judge had to overcome substantial
contrary evidence. A senior executive from Microsoft had testified that the
company would not enter the government's market, not only because "that
is not a segment we are targeting" '' but also because it would not be a pru-
dent use of the company's funds:
Burgum was asked why Microsoft didn't "just spend a bunch of money" to redevelop the
code and the salesforce in order to compete for larger accounts. Burgum stated that [the] un-
dertaking would "be a formidable task" and would "take more money than I would be will-
ing to recommend that Microsoft spend.
'20 2
Moreover, another software firm had devoted many years and a great deal
of money to an unsuccessful effort to enter the government's proposed
market, as a former vice president of that firm testified: "[We] came to the
conclusion that after about a decade involved in the effort, hundred[s] of
millions of dollars of investment, we didn't have the products, services, and
ultimately the reputation necessary to satisfy the requirements that up-
market customers have.."203 Thus, both the most likely potential entrant and
198 In some cases, the profitability of entry can be determined without estimating minimum viable
scale. For example, if the court found a large Stiglerian barrier (i.e., a large cost disadvantage), it could
conclude that entry would be unprofitable simply because an entrant could not survive at the premerger
price level. Similarly, if government regulation would preclude entry altogether, or delay it beyond any
reasonable period, it would not be necessary to calculate minimum viable scale. These exceptions,
however, do not account for most of the cases in which the courts did not address the issue.
199 See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
200 Id. at 1160 ("Accordingly, the court finds that Microsoft will be a viable substitute for a signifi-
cant number of consumers should a post-merger Oracle impose a SSNIP in its pricing of ERP soft-
ware."). As noted in our earlier discussion of Oracle, the court called such entry "repositioning" since
Microsoft already offered software that performed a number of the functions required for participation
in the government's proposed product market. Id. at 1109; see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying
text. The issue was whether Microsoft would develop the additional functionality required for full par-
ticipation in the market if Oracle imposed a "SSNIP" (a small but significant and nontransitory increase
in price). See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
201 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
202 Id (citations omitted).
203 Id. at 1144 (referring to the government's market as the "up-market").
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an unsuccessful entrant had examined the issue (one at great cost) and de-
cided that entry into the "up-market" was unlikely to be profitable.
The court rejected the testimony of both firms because it was con-
vinced that Microsoft had the intent and the ability to enter.2"4 The intent
evidence the judge relied on, however, was ambiguous. For example, while
Microsoft had embarked on an advertising campaign stressing that its soft-
ware could handle "multiple languages, currencies and businesses,"2 5 this
feature would appeal to potential customers in its existing segment as well
as to up-market customers. If Microsoft had been targeting the "up-market,"
moreover, it was not evident to up-market customers. Twelve up-market
customers testified at the hearing, ten for the government and two for Ora-
cle, and not one said that Microsoft would soon be an option for them." 6 As
the court emphasized, Microsoft did have the ability to enter the up-market:
"Microsoft has the money, the reputation and now, due to the BearingPoint
alliance, it has the sales force necessary to become a major competitor for
up-market business."2 °7 Ability, however, is not the same as willingness.
The question was not whether Microsoft could enter but whether it would
enter. The court never addressed whether it would be profitable for Micro-
soft to enter the government's market. It did not estimate the minimum
amount of business Microsoft would need to be profitable nor whether Mi-
crosoft could attain that volume quickly and cheaply enough to make the
effort worthwhile.0 8
In Franklin Electric, the court concluded that entry was unlikely to de-
feat a postmerger price increase within a few years, in part because the
''costs of entry are high in relation to the size of the market and realizable
profits.""2 9 This suggests that the relevant market is protected by a scale
economy barrier: if the costs of entry are high in relation to the size of the
market, an entrant cannot be profitable unless it attains a substantial market
share, which may be difficult. To determine whether such a barrier is likely
to deter entry, though, it is necessary to estimate the entrant's minimum
viable scale and the volume of sales it is likely to capture. The Franklin
Electric court did not attempt to determine the magnitude of either variable.
204 Id. at 1160.
205 See id. at 1144 ("Subsequent to trial, BearingPoint announced that the new Microsoft Business
Solutions Axapta was 'a compelling ERP solution' which 'provides functionality across all key areas of
the business ...').
206 See id. at 1125-33 (summarizing the testimony of the customer witnesses).
207 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2dat 1160.
208 Ironically, the judge had previously rejected the testimony of the government's customer wit-
nesses because they did not back up their conclusions with "serious analysis" of "what they would or
could do ... to avoid a price increase from a postmerger Oracle." Id. at 1131. Yet in concluding that
Microsoft would enter the government's market, the judge himself did not offer a "serious analysis" of
"what [Microsoft] would ... do" in response to a postmerger price increase. See id.
209 United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
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v. No Prediction of Reactions of Incumbents or Customers
The reactions of incumbents and customers affect how high a price the
entrant can charge and how much business it is likely to capture. Yet few
court decisions since April 1992 have tried to determine the likely reactions
of either incumbents or customers to new entry, let alone both factors.
(a) Incumbents
Incumbents can reduce the profitability of entry by cutting their prices
or expanding their promotional spending as the entrant tries to become es-
tablished, forcing it to respond in kind.211 Incumbents may also react to en-
try by accommodating it rather than attacking it, maintaining their pre-entry
price levels or even reducing their pre-entry output. The choice among
these strategies depends on a complex collection of strategic factors, since
the issue is similar to the question of whether an incumbent should attempt
to drive out an entrant through predatory pricing. If, for example, the en-
trant is growing but needs to make further investments in plant, promotion,
or distribution in order to attain minimum viable scale, the incumbents may
find it profitable to respond aggressively in hopes of deterring such invest-
ments. If, on the other hand, the entrant has already made the requisite in-
vestments in the market, and those investments are sunk, the incumbents
may find it optimal to accommodate rather than attack the entrant.2t An
entrant's need to make a series of investments in the market, rather than
210 The empirical literature indicates that incumbents are unlikely to react to the mere appearance
of an entrant, since most entrants are unsuccessful and pose no threat to the incumbents. When an en-
trant begins to take significant sales from an incumbent, however, the incumbent may respond aggres-
sively, and if it does, the studies suggest it is more likely to expand advertising than cut prices. See
Geroski, supra note 60, at 431-34; Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 134-35.
211 Coate and Langenfeld write that once an entrant has sunk the costs necessary to compete in the
market, the incumbents and the entrant are in the same position, implying that it may make no more
sense at that point for the incumbents to try to drive out the entrant than for the entrant to try to drive out
the incumbents. See Coate & Langenfeld, supra note 11, at 587-88, 588 n.72. Professor Einer Elhauge
maintains that a monopolist cannot drive out an equally efficient entrant who has incurred the necessary
sunk costs unless the monopolist prices below variable costs: "Because the entrant has committed the
sunk costs, the monopolist cannot drive the entrant out with any low price that is above their equally
efficient variable costs." Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 720 (2003).
Yet the monopolist cannot price below its variable costs in order to eliminate the entrant without risking
liability for predatory pricing. See id at 706. In this circumstance, according to Elhauge, the monopo-
list's best strategy is to accommodate the entrant: "Thus, as soon as it realizes the entrant is equally
efficient, the incumbent monopolist will endeavor to accommodate entry by pricing at supracompetitive
duopoly levels rather than dropping prices to less profitable above-cost levels in a fruitless attempt to
drive out the entrant." Id. at 720.
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being able to commit itself all at once, may thus affect the incumbents' re-
actions. 2
However the incumbents react, their reactions-and the entrant's reac-
tion to their reactions-influence the amount of business the entrant is
likely to win. The more, for example, that incumbents cut prices or expand
output in response to entry and the less the entrant adjusts its own prices in
response, the less business the entrant will capture. If price levels fall,
moreover, the entrant must capture a greater percentage of sales to attain
profitability. Professor Salop explains: "If prices are cut, that will reduce
the entrant's margin over variable costs, and thus will raise the sales level it
must achieve in order to break even. 21 3
The opinions we reviewed, however, almost never addressed the po-
tential reactions of incumbents to entry. One exception was Judge Hogan's
thoughtful analysis in Swedish Match, where he observed that because ex-
isting producers had excess capacity, they "could simply increase produc-
tion as an effective competitive response to new entrants. 21 4 Even Judge
Hogan, however, did not get to the root of the issue, which was not whether
incumbents had the ability to increase production in response to entry, but
whether they were likely to do so. 215
(b) Customers
Like the reactions of incumbents, the reactions of customers affect the
profitability of entry because they influence how much business the entrant
is likely to obtain. The entrant's success depends crucially on how many
customers are willing to switch from the incumbents to the new entrant.
Where entry occurs in response to a postmerger price increase, this willing-
ness to switch is subject to conflicting impulses. On the one hand, custom-
ers would like to purchase from the entrant because they are presumably
upset with the incumbents for raising prices, the entrant is offering a lower
price, and if the entrant succeeds, it will restore the premerger price level.
212 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan single out this factor in explaining
why a supplier of television service might prefer to enter a local market by building a microwave system
based on one transmitter rather than a cable system constructed in stages:
The main advantage of entry by microwave may simply have been that it was less suscepti-
ble to predation. A microwave system required only one transmitter, and once that invest-
ment was sunk, the entrant would have the incentive to remain in the market so long as price
exceeded incremental cost for the entire system. By contrast, the sequential nature of the
sunk cost investment in building a cable system made it especially vulnerable to predation.
Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and
Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2297 n.255 (2000).
213 Salop, supra note 15, at 563.
214 FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (D.D.C. 2000).
215 See, e.g., Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 124 ("Expectations of future profits ... depend
on potential entrants' conjectures about how established firms will react to entry.") (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, switching to the entrant presents an array of problems.
First, customers have had no experience with the entrant in this market and
perhaps in any market, and thus cannot be certain about the quality of its
product, its service, and its commitment to the market. Second, if a cus-
tomer shifts a significant amount of its business to the entrant, it will strain
its relationships with its incumbent suppliers. Third, if the entrant fails, the
customer may be unable to reestablish these relationships on the same terms
as before, placing it at a competitive disadvantage compared to those cus-
tomers who never switched. Moreover, these conflicts not only make a de-
cision to patronize the entrant difficult, they also create a prisoner's di-
lemma. All customers would be better off if the entrant succeeds, but each
would be better off if its rivals took the risks necessary to support the new
entrant.2 6
No court identified all these conflicting impulses, nor did any court,
after weighing them all, try to predict the overall customer response to new
entry. A few courts did give some weight to the most readily understood
customer impulse-customers' reluctance to switch from an established
product, which they know, to an entrant's product, which they have never
tried before. In Swedish Match, Judge Hogan identified "brand loyalty" as
one of the barriers to entering the relevant market, observed that the defen-
dants spent a substantial amount annually on sales and promotion, noted
that new brand introductions by smaller firms have had little success, and
concluded: "New entrants therefore face a significant disincentive because
of high costs and little hope of gaining market share." '217 Two other opinions
alluded to this same dynamic but did not evaluate its significance. They
simply pointed out that the incumbents enjoyed a reputation for quality;
they did not ask whether new entrants could duplicate this reputation
quickly and cheaply.2"8
Apart from these references to brand loyalty, the courts did not assess
the likely reactions of customers to entry, even when evaluating whether
economies of scale constituted a barrier to entering the relevant market.
While economies of scale can place an entrant at a disadvantage relative to
216 See Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REv. 655, 697 (1982) (discussing a similar collective action in
the context of predatory pricing; noting that if customers try to defeat a predation attempt by banding
together and executing long-term supply contracts with the entrant, they "may involve considerable
private costs" and the success of their effort is "improbable").
217 Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 171. For the evidence supporting this conclusion, see id. at
170-71.
218 See United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (noting
that the merging parties' brands "are recognized names in the submersible turbine pump market; dis-
tributors and gas station operators know their reputation for product quality, delivery, warranties and
service"); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (referring to
the "perceived higher quality of care available at defendant hospitals"), aff'd per curiam without pub-
lished opinion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
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incumbents, the extent of this disadvantage depends critically on the will-
ingness of customers to switch from the incumbents to the entrant. Even if
an entrant needs to attain a large scale to be profitable at the premerger
price, the entrant can easily attain this scale if the incumbents' customers
promptly shift their business to the entrant. Because of this fact, R. Preston
McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon, and Michael A. Williams maintain that scale
economies are not a "primary" entry barrier at all. 19 Rather, scale econo-
mies do not deter entry in their view unless some factor such as brand loy-
alty prevents buyers from switching from the incumbents to the entrant.220
This position overlooks another factor, however, that is likely to prevent
buyers from switching to the entrant-an aggressive response by the in-
cumbents. If incumbents respond aggressively to entry, promptly matching
or even undercutting the entrant's price, few customers are likely to switch.
Because this possibility is quite real when scale economies are large rela-
tive to the size of the market, very large scale economies may be a major
barrier even without significant brand loyalty.221 But whatever the potential
impediment to switching-brand loyalty or an aggressive response by the
incumbents-it is necessary to assess customers' willingness to shift busi-
ness in order to determine the extent to which scale economies would im-
pede entry.
Even sophisticated authorities can miss this point. In illustrating how
scale economies deter entry, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise provides an
example that ignores the customer shifting issue.22 The example portrays
an entrant who cannot make a profit at the premerger price unless it attains
a large volume, but the example does not explain why the entrant cannot
capture this volume. It simply assumes that the incumbents lose no sales to
the entrant. Similarly, Judge Hogan overlooked the customer switching
issue in Staples when he concluded that new entrants were unlikely to
achieve the scale economies they needed because many local office super-
store markets were already "saturated":
219 McAfee, Mialon & Williams, supra note 68, at 464.
220 Id. ("Customers may be loyal to an existing brand because continuing to buy it involves less
risk than trying a new one. Therefore, scale economies deter entry only if customers are sufficiently
loyal to the incumbent's brand. Hence, scale economies are ancillary entry barriers that reinforce pri-
mary entry barriers such as brand loyalty.").
221 When scale economies are very large, an entrant is unlikely to attain profitability unless it takes
a considerable amount of business from the incumbents, which makes it likely they will respond quickly
and aggressively. See Salop, supra note 15, at 561. Put differently, when scale economies are large
relative to the size of the market, entry at efficient scale would place substantial new capacity on the
market, the incumbents are likely to react vigorously, and the market price may drop sharply, rendering
the entry attempt unprofitable. The Guidelines emphasize this phenomenon. See MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 13, § 3.0.
222 See 2B AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, 421 a, at 80 n.2.
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Economies of scale at the local level, such as in the costs of advertizing and distribution,
would also be difficult for a new superstore entrant to achieve since the three existing firms
have saturated many important local markets. For example, according to the defendants' own
saturation analyses, Staples estimates that there is room for less than two additional super-
stores in the Washington, D.C. area and Office Depot estimates that there is room for only
two more superstores in Tampa, Florida.
223
The defendants' saturation analyses, however, were conducted before the
challenged merger was proposed, when prices in these markets were at the
premerger level.224 If the merger occurred and prices in these markets were
raised to supracompetitive levels, the markets may no longer be saturated.
At that point, in other words, consumers might be quite willing to switch to
a lower-priced entrant. Of course, their willingness to do so would depend
on their loyalty to the incumbents' brands, their irritation at the price in-
crease, and the speed and extent of the incumbents' response to entry, but
Judge Hogan did not evaluate these factors.225
Judge Sporkin's analysis of entry in Cardinal Health displayed an un-
usual, but ultimately incomplete, sensitivity to customer reactions to entry.
His opinion was the only one that recognized that customers are likely to be
upset by an anticompetitive postmerger price increase. He declared: "De-
fendants could not easily engage in anti-competitive pricing practices after
the mergers without incurring the wrath of [their] customers. ' 226 He also
recognized that customers might translate this wrath into an effective re-
sponse by sponsoring new entry. He found that "local customers can spon-
sor the entry of regional wholesalers into a new region with relative ease
and limited capital expenditure. '227 Judge Sporkin never explained, how-
ever, why the prospect of customer-sponsored entry did not invalidate his
earlier conclusion that the challenged mergers would be anticompetitive in
the relevant regional markets.22s
223 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1087 (D.D.C. 1997). The federal enforcement agencies
also emphasized this aspect of Staples in their recent Commentary on the Guidelines:
The Commission found, and the court agreed, that entry was unlikely to prevent anticompeti-
tive effects arising from the merger. Important to this finding was that the three incumbent
office superstores had saturated many of the local markets such that a new office superstore
entrant would have difficulty in achieving economies of scale ....
COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 38.
224 See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1076, 1087.
225 Another relevant factor is the rate at which the market is growing. See infra Part lIl.B.2.a. In
Staples, the saturated markets were probably not growing rapidly. That factor, coupled with significant
scale economies and existing store density, would have contributed to the difficulty of entering the
saturated markets. The degree of difficulty cannot be determined, however, without assessing the will-
ingness of customers to switch to the entrant.
226 FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 60 (D.D.C. 1998).
227 Id. at 67 n. 18; see also id. at 60 ("Sponsored entry of a smaller wholesaler or outside company
into a new region of the market is also a viable alternative to the Defendants for institutional GPOs
[group purchasing organizations].").
228 Judge Sporkin held that the relevant geographic markets consisted of a national market and
three regional markets. See id. at 50-51. He also held that the challenged mergers would leave customers
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The best analysis of customer reactions to entry, one that explicitly
addressed whether the difficulty of attracting customers might undermine
the profitability of entry, appeared in CCC Holdings.229 In this case, one of
the relevant product markets was software that enables insurance compa-
nies and repair shops to calculate the cost of fixing a damaged vehicle.23° In
order to perform the necessary calculations, such software must have access
to a large database of parts and labor costs. 23' One of the merging firms
(CCC) licensed its database from a third party (Hearst); the other merging
firm (Mitchell) and the other major firm in the market (Audatex) created
and maintained their own databases.232 To counter the claim that a new en-
trant could not possibly create an adequate database in a timely manner,
CCC announced that "upon consummation of the merger, it will relinquish
its exclusive rights to license Hearst's Motor database, allowing any com-
petitor or entrant ... to obtain immediate access to a comprehensive, fully
updated database of parts and services. ' 233 The court questioned, -however,
whether a new entrant could profitably license this database, given the dif-
ficulty of winning customers from the large incumbents, whose differenti-
ated products gave them market power:
CCC currently pays $ [text redacted] million per year for its exclusive license of the Motor
database. While a new entrant might be expected to pay significantly less for a non-exclusive
license, that negotiated price remains unknown and unknowable. A price that approached the
$ [text redacted] million range that Mitchell and Audatex spend annually to maintain their
databases may be prohibitively expensive for new entrants who also must offer lower prices
to attract customers. Because this is a low-growth industry with few new customers, new en-
trants would have to win business from incumbents to generate sufficient revenues to remain
a going concern for any length of time. It is unclear whether they could do so profitably, or if
the projected profits would be sufficient to entice new entrants, given the market power that
would be held by CCC/Mitchell and Audatex. See Merger Guidelines § 3.3 (entry considered
in the regional markets vulnerable to a price increase: "After the mergers, only two national wholesale
distributors would exist, leaving no choice for customers in certain regions . I... d  at 58; see also id. at
51 ("The uncontested evidence shows that the Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle regions are
particularly concentrated and would be vulnerable to anti-competitive practices should the injunction be
denied."). He concluded that customers in these regions would have "no choice," even though two
national wholesalers would remain, because most customers want both a primary and a secondary
wholesaler. Id. at 41, 58. In order to have competition for both positions, they would need three altema-
tive suppliers. In his analysis of entry, Judge Sporkin found that new entry was unlikely to produce the
necessary third wholesaler. See id. at 54-58. Later in his opinion, however, he found that customers in
these regions could sponsor new entry with "relative ease and limited capital expenditure." Id. at 67
n. 18. He never reconciled these inconsistent findings.
229 FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 47-60 (D.D.C. 2009).
230 Id. at 31-32, 38-39.
231 Id. at 32.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 51.
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"likely" if it would be profitable at premerger prices, and if such prices could be secured by
the entrant).
2 4
In many respects, this discussion is commendable. It recognizes that the
likelihood of new entry depends on its profitability and that this depends on
the entrant's expected revenues. It also recognizes that the entrant's reve-
nues depend on its ability to lure customers away from the incumbents, a
consideration that is especially important in a low-growth industry. Finally,
it appreciates that an entrant cannot lure customers from the incumbents
without offering them a reason to switch, and that this reason-typically a
lower price-makes it more difficult for an entrant to achieve profitability.
Despite its sophistication, this discussion falls short of a rigorous
analysis in two ways. First, it did not actually determine the likelihood of
new entry. While it identified many of the relevant economic issues, it did
not resolve them, probably because the parties did not present sufficient
information to decide whether an entrant in these circumstances would
likely make money. Second, the court brushed aside a key advantage an
entrant would have: it would be entering in response to a significant an-
ticompetitive price increase imposed by the merged firm. As Judge Sporkin
emphasized, 35 such an increase is likely to anger customers and make them
more willing to switch to the entrant. The court disregarded this factor in
CCC Holdings because the Merger Guidelines indicate that entry must be
profitable at "premerger prices."236 But that misreads the Guidelines. They
do not insist that entry must be so quick and effective that prices never rise
above the premerger level. To the contrary, they plainly contemplate that
the merger may produce a significant anticompetitive price increase and
that, in response, entry may "cause prices to fall to their premerger levels or
lower." '237
4. No Utilization of Efficiencies Evidence
In all the cases we reviewed, the defendants offered an efficiencies de-
fense, arguing that the challenged transaction would reduce their costs or
234 Id. at 51-52 (citations to the record omitted).
235 FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 60 (D.D.C. 1998).
236 See CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
237 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.0. As noted above, entry meets the Guidelines tests of
timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency so long as it forces prices back to premerger levels within two
years and they remain there. In the short run, in other words, prices may rise above premerger levels; in
the long run, they cannot. The Guidelines make clear that the premerger price level constraint applies to
the long run, not the short run, in the following passage: "Entry that is sufficient to counteract the com-
petitive effects of concern will cause prices to fall to their premerger levels or lower. Thus, the profit-
ability of such committed entry must be determined on the basis of premerger market prices over the
long-term." Id.
[VOL. 17:1
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 82 2009-2010
2009] REINVIGORATING THE NEGLECTED PHASE OF MERGER ANALYSIS 83
otherwise improve their performance. In only one decision, however, did
the court use the evidence generated on the efficiencies issue to improve its
assessment of the likelihood of entry. In every other case, the court did not
connect these two parts of merger analysis, failing to recognize that if a
merger creates efficiencies, it is likely to change entry conditions, some-
times making them more difficult and sometimes making them easier.238
In the typical case, the merging parties assert that the transaction
would enable them to avoid redundant expenses, lowering their operating
costs. If this claim were correct, it would tend to make postmerger entry
more difficult for two reasons. First, it would increase the merged firm's
ability to reduce price below the premerger level without pricing below
cost. In turn, the merged firm could respond more aggressively to entry
without violating the tests for predatory pricing established in Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.23 9 Second, a merger-
238 Neither the Merger Guidelines nor the agencies' recent commentary on the Guidelines notes the
connection between efficiencies and entry. See id. § 3; COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 37-47. In the
commentary, however, it is possible to trace the connection, since the commentary indicates that
economies of scale are both an entry barrier and an efficiency. See id. at 45 ("A merger may lead to
price increases but not attract entry because entrants would suffer a significant cost disadvantage relative
to incumbents. The most common reason for a cost disadvantage is the presence of significant econo-
mies of scale .... "); id. at 51 ("Merging parties ... may claim cost savings from ... realizing econo-
mies of scale.").
Greg Werden and Luke Froeb identify another link between efficiencies and entry barriers. They
note that if a merger would not create significant efficiencies, the merging parties must expect that it
would generate market power, because otherwise the merger would not be profitable. As a result, Wer-
den and Froeb contend that if the parties cannot demonstrate efficiencies, entry barriers can be pre-
sumed:
If... firms are rational and informed, they merge only if they expect significant efficiency
gains generated from merger, or they perceive substantial entry obstacles such as sunk costs.
Consequently, the entry issue in merger cases can be collapsed into efficiency considerations,
and in the absence of strong evidence that an otherwise anticompetitive merger generates
significant efficiency gains, there is a sound basis for presuming that entry obstacles will
prevent entry in response. Thus, the best way for courts to treat entry in many merger cases
may be not to consider it at all.
Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Enry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Explora-
tory Analysis, 46 J. INDus. ECON. 525, 541 (1998) (footnote omitted). This principle would enable
courts to avoid an analysis of entry in any case in which the government establishes a presumption of
anticompetitive effects and the parties cannot establish any significant merger-specific efficiencies. It is
not clear, though, whether such cases would often occur.
239 509 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1993). In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff cannot
prevail in a predatory pricing case unless it shows that the defendant priced below cost. While the Court
did not decide the appropriate cost test, it left no doubt that above-cost pricing was not predatory. See id.
at 222 ("[A] plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival's low prices must
prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs."); id. at 223
("[T]he reasoning in [two prior] opinions suggests that only below-cost prices should suffice, and we
have rejected elsewhere the notion that above-cost prices that are below general market levels or the
costs of a firm's competitors inflict injury to competition cognizable under the antitrust laws."). After
Brooke Group, the lower courts have been most concerned about pricing below average variable costs.
See Elhauge, supra note 211, at 693, 696 & n.49 (finding that the federal courts are divided as to
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induced reduction in costs may raise the scale required for entry. In order to
compete against a more efficient rival, especially a rival that is likely to
respond vigorously to entry, a new entrant may have to enter at a larger
scale in order to lower its own costs. But entering at a larger scale is likely
to raise the costs and risks of entry, diminishing its attractiveness.
In contrast, some merger-specific synergies may make entry easier.
Suppose that two manufacturers propose to merge and consolidate their
operations in a single plant, putting their other plant up for sale. If that plant
has limited uses outside the relevant market, an entrant may be able to ac-
quire it at a price below its replacement cost, lowering the capital costs of
entry. Indeed, whenever merging firms avoid redundant costs by disposing
of facilities or laying off personnel and those resources become available at
a price below the price that previously prevailed for comparable resources,
the efficiencies of the merger would reduce the investment required for
entry.
Both possibilities were present in Staples, although Judge Hogan did
not mention them. The defendants in Staples asserted that their merger
would produce a variety of efficiencies, including better prices from ven-
dors and reduced distribution costs.24 ° While Judge Hogan identified nu-
merous flaws in this defense and concluded that it did not rebut the pre-
sumption of anticompetitive effect,24' he did not find that the merger would
create no significant efficiencies. It is likely, therefore, that the merger
would have increased the ability of a combined Staples and Office Depot to
respond to entry by dropping prices below premerger levels without engag-
ing in predatory pricing. At the same time, Judge Hogan found that the
merger would result in the closing of forty to seventy Office Depot and
Staples stores, the elimination of unnecessary distribution facilities, and the
termination of many of Office Depot's key personnel.242 The availability of
these stores, warehouses, and personnel may have reduced the costs of an
entry attempt.
In Dr Pepper/Seven-Up, in contrast, Judge Revercomb recognized the
connection between efficiencies and entry conditions.243 He found that a
merger-induced increase in economies of scale would both reduce costs and
raise entry barriers." He agreed with the plaintiffs that the transaction
would benefit both the merging parties (a Pepsi Cola bottler and a Seven-
Up bottler) and one of their suppliers (Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up) because it
whether pricing above average variable costs but below average total costs can be predatory); see also
supra note 211.
240 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089-90 (D.D.C. 1997).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1091.
243 See Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762, 777-78 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
244 See id.
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would create a bottler with greater scale and lower average costs.2145 He also
recognized, though, that once the Pepsi bottler had acquired the Seven-Up
bottler, it would be more difficult for a new entrant to attain cost parity with
the Pepsi bottler: "[T]he acquisition of the Seven-Up bottling franchise by
the Pepsi bottler would increase the barriers to entry to new bottlers, be-
cause Seven-Up would be unavailable to bottlers seeking to build up the
requisite market share to compete effectively with Coke and Pepsi prod-
ucts.
246
Unlike the courts' analysis of likelihood, their assessment of suffi-
ciency has not been marred by widespread deficiencies. To the contrary,
only a few opinions directly addressed the subject and their language gen-
erally accorded with the Guidelines and economic theory.
5. Judicial Analysis of Sufficiency
Three decisions since April 1992 found that entry would be insuffi-
cient to remedy the competitive problems posed by challenged mergers. In
Cardinal Health, Judge Sporkin sustained the FTC's attack on two pro-
posed combinations of national prescription drug wholesalers. 247 He ac-
knowledged that if the combined firms raised prices in certain geographic
markets, regional wholesalers from other markets would enter those mar-
kets and "certainly win more business away from the Defendants. '248 He
concluded, however, that their expansion would be insufficient to replace
the competition lost through the mergers.249 In Swedish Match, Judge Hogan
found that entry into the loose leaf chewing tobacco market was extremely
unlikely because of numerous barriers.2 ° He also noted that even if entry
occurred in the form of new product introductions by existing producers, it
would be insufficient to defeat a postmerger price increase: "No historical
evidence of new brand introduction has demonstrated success in restraining
245 Id. at 777 ("[P]laintiffs-especially DPSU [Dr Pepper/Seven-Up]-repeatedly pointed out to
the FTC the cost advantages that would accrue from allowing a small concentrate manufacturer (like
DPSU) to 'piggyback' on the distribution network of a local bottler of one of the two major brands
(Coke and Pepsi) .... Third bottlers are usually much smaller operators who do not enjoy the same
economies of scale as Coke or Pepsi distributors .... The Court finds merit in plaintiffs' argument
...."). In this case, the acquiring firm and Dr Pepper/Seven-Up were plaintiffs because the FTC had
refused to approve the acquisition. The acquiring firm had previously signed a consent order with the
FTC that prohibited the acquisition without prior Commission approval. See id. at 765.
246 Id. at 778.
247 FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1998).
248 Id. at 58.
249 Id. (finding that regional wholesalers "would not sufficiently expand to compete with the na-
tionals"). As noted above, however, the judge relied on evidence that was inadequate to support his
conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
250 FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (D.D.C. 2000) (multiple barriers "will pre-
vent new entry into this market").
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prices. In fact, the evidence shows that brands introduced by competitors
such [as] Conwood and Swisher have had at best marginal success and
nominal effect on constraining the prices of existing brands of loose leaf."25'
Finally, in Chicago Bridge, a case that focused on the sufficiency of entry,
the Fifth Circuit noted that there had been one successful entrant after the
acquisition but concluded that its impact was "marginal at best." '252
One decision, however, overlooked a significant sufficiency issue. In
Mercy Health, the judge rejected a challenge to the merger of the only two
general acute care hospitals in Dubuque, Iowa, largely on geographic mar-
ket grounds." 3 He also found, however, that entry into the government's
proposed market would be easy.254 While he concluded that "regional hospi-
tals" could not enter the government's market by building new hospitals, he
decided they could enter by opening "outreach clinics," clinics that would
refer patients needing hospitalization to the regional hospital.255 He did not
ask, though, whether entry by outreach clinics would be sufficient to elimi-
nate the merger's anticompetitive effects. He had previously noted that in-
dividual outreach clinics had "dramatically altered" referral patterns in sev-
eral communities.256 But even if that were true for each clinic, it would not
undermine a price increase unless the regional hospitals opened enough
outreach clinics to cause the merged hospital to suffer a total loss in patient
volume sufficient to make the price increase unprofitable. The court did not
evaluate this issue.257 On the contrary, it acknowledged that the "effect of
251 Id. at 171.
252 Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 435-36 (5th Cir. 2008). In CCC Holdings, the
court observed that it could not tell whether one form of entry-web-based entry by a firm called "Web-
Est"--would satisfy the Guidelines' test of sufficiency because there was no evidence regarding
whether customers would consider Web-Est's product a close substitute for the merged firm's product.
See FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 59 (D.D.C. 2009) ("From this record, it is simply
unknown how many insurance companies and DRP repair facilities will find Web-Est's communicating
Estimatics product to be up to par ... ").
253 United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 971, 987 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as
moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
254 Id. at 986.
255 Id. at 974-75, 986. The entire discussion of the entry issue was as follows:
The court also wishes to note that other hospital merger cases have not considered the impact
of outreach clinics in their discussions of barriers to entry into the relevant geographic mar-
ket. Most hospital cases have stated the inability to build new hospitals as a strong barrier to
entry. The parties to this dispute have stipulated that no new hospital would be built in the
tri-state area within the relevant time frame. However, entry would not necessitate the build-
ing of a new hospital, but merely requires that another entity be able to enter a market it was
not previously servicing. The regional hospitals are able to do this through the establishment
of outreach clinics.
Id. at 986 (citation omitted).
256 Id. at 979.
257 As noted above, the court did not even address whether regional hospitals were likely to open
additional outreach clinics in the event of a postmerger price increase. It simply found that "regional
hospitals are able to do this." Id. at 986.
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the outreach clinics has not been quantified."2"8 Many issues in merger
analysis, however, are inescapably quantitative, including the profitability
and sufficiency of new entry.
Our review of litigated government merger challenges since April
1992 indicates, in short, that judicial analysis of the entry issue has fre-
quently been inadequate, particularly in assessing the likelihood of new
entry. To improve the analysis in future cases, we propose a new approach
to the issue, one that combines the courts' focus on entry barriers with the
Guidelines' emphasis on the profitability of entry. This approach would
make it easier for the courts to reach economically sound resolutions of the
entry question without rendering the litigation unmanageable.259
III. LITIGATING THE ENTRY ISSUE IN FUTURE CASES
Our proposed approach to litigating the entry issue in merger cases
would reduce the problems that have plagued past judicial analysis. In Sec-
tion A, we outline the approach, specifying its allocation of the burdens of
production and proof and noting that these assignments are consistent with
Baker Hughes. We also explain why we would not follow the very different
approach advocated by the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise. Parts III.B and
III.C describe our framework in more detail. In Part Ill.B, we set forth the
defendants' burden of production on the entry issue, encapsulated in the
obligation to introduce substantial evidence of a "path to profitability." In
Part III.C, we make clear that the ultimate burden of proof on the entry is-
sue would fall on the government and that it could not discharge this burden
without addressing the height of the entry barriers that assertedly protect the
relevant market. These two sections also discuss the types of evidence each
party could introduce to support its case. In Part III.D, we describe other
categories of evidence either side could submit.
258 Id.
259 The Antitrust Section's recent monograph on market power asserts that the entry issue requires
a comprehensive, fact-specific inquiry:
The likelihood of entry is a fact-specific inquiry that, like market power and relevant market
analysis, requires a comprehensive assessment of the structural and behavioral characteristics
of the market and firms at issue. No single test exists for whether entry will be likely, timely
or successful. Rather, the analysis must consider a wide range of evidence.
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 139. We agree with
the Section that there is "no single test" and that a "wide range of evidence" is relevant. Given the
courts' record to date, however, we doubt they would undertake a comprehensive economic analysis of
the likelihood of entry unless they are given a workable process for doing so. For that reason, we pro-
pose a structured approach that assigns specific burdens to each of the parties and describes the kinds of
evidence that could satisfy each party's burden. See infra Part Ill.
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A. Overview
Under our approach, the obligation of raising the entry issue and sup-
porting it with enough evidence to make out a prima facie case of easy en-
try would rest on the defendants. If defendants contend, in other words, that
new entry would promptly eliminate-or deter altogether-the merger's
asserted anticompetitive effects, they would have to introduce substantial
evidence that entry would meet all three of the Guidelines' criteria-
timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency. Defendants could not make out such
a prima facie case, moreover, without demonstrating a "path to profitabil-
ity"-a business strategy that is likely to enable a firm to achieve entry that
is both profitable and adequate in scope and speed to restore prices and
other terms to premerger levels within a reasonably short period of time.
If the defendants carry this burden of production, the government
would have the opportunity to show that the defendants' path to profitabil-
ity is flawed and that new entry would not in fact satisfy all the Guidelines'
tests. To do so, the government would have to establish that the relevant
market is protected by one or more barriers of sufficient height that entry is
unlikely to be timely, profitable, and sufficient. The ultimate burden of
proof on the entry issue would rest with the government.
This approach is consistent with the oft-cited formulation of the par-
ties' burdens in Baker Hughes:
By showing that a transaction will lead to undue concentration in the market for a particular
product in a particular geographic area, the government establishes a presumption that the
transaction will substantially lessen competition. The burden of producing evidence to rebut
this presumption then shifts to the defendant. If the defendant successfully rebuts the pre-
sumption, the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the
government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the
government at all times.
26
0
In contrast, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise proposes a sharply different
approach, one that would largely remove the entry issue from merger litiga-
tion. Under their approach, the burden of proof on the entry issue would be
shifted to the defendants in three classes of cases that present especially
significant competitive risks.26 1 In such cases, moreover, the defendants
could satisfy their burden only by showing frequent recent entries or an
260 United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (footnote and cita-
tions omitted).
261 See 4 AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, 941h, at 212 ("Three classes of situations present
very strong claims for reassignment of the burden with respect to entry barriers: (1) mergers to monop-
oly, (2) the monopolist's or dominant firm's acquisition of a nascent rival, and (3) mergers meeting the
highest anticompetitive standard for potentially collusive or oligopoly behavior-namely, where the
postmerger HHI exceeds 1800 and the merger itself augments the HHI by at least 100 points.").
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otherwise "clear case" of easy entry.262 In effect, then, the treatise would tilt
the resolution of the entry issue against defendants in these cases, in part
because they create a "sufficiently strong inference of anticompetitive con-
sequences,"263 and in part because the entry issue is "so intractable." 26
This approach appears to be undesirable for several reasons. First, the
government virtually never takes a merger case to court unless it falls into
one of these categories.265 As a result, the treatise would largely resolve the
entry issue against the defendants in almost every case the government liti-
gates. Second, to our knowledge there is no substantive basis for presuming
that entry would typically be difficult whenever postmerger Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ("HHI") concentration exceeds 1800.266 To the contrary,
in several well-known decisions the courts ruled that entry was easy even
though postmerger concentration was substantially above that level. 267 Be-
cause of these decisions, the courts are unlikely to adopt a presumption that
entry is blockaded whenever the government establishes that the post-
merger market would be highly concentrated. Finally, the courts do not find
the entry issue intractable now; they deal with it relatively easily, if not
well. Our approach would enable them to address it more rigorously while
still keeping the litigation manageable. We believe, in short, that our ap-
proach is both substantively superior and more likely to be adopted than the
Areeda-Hovenkamp approach.
B. Defendants' Burden of Production: A Path to Profitability
If the defendants contend that easy entry rebuts the presumption of an-
ticompetitive effects established by the government, they must introduce
substantial evidence that new entry would satisfy all three of the Guide-
262 Id. 941f, at 207 ("[D]efendants should be allowed to defend a prima facie illegal merger on
easy entry grounds only by showing a clear case or by showing 'frequent' new entries within a defined
recent period.").
263 Id. 941h,at212.
264 Id. 941fat207.
265 Out of the twenty-seven merger challenges we reviewed, the courts noted the market shares or
concentration in the government's principal market in nineteen. In all nineteen, the postmerger HHI
concentration was above 1800 and the change in concentration was likely to exceed 100. In the other
eight, we saw no reason to doubt that these concentration thresholds were also surpassed.
266 To be sure, there may well be an association between concentration and entry barriers, since
markets may be concentrated because they are difficult to enter. However, a market may become con-
centrated because a large merger occurs in that market, and when that is so, there appears to be no
reason to presume that the market is protected by high entry barriers.
267 See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (postmerger
HHI 4303); United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 666 (9th Cir. 1990) (calculating the HHI
based on the information provided by the court indicates a postmerger HHI above 8600); United States
v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1984) (the market percentages determined by the
court yield a postmerger HHI above 2380), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
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lines' tests. In order to do that, defendants would have to identify a "path to
profitability"-a business strategy that would likely result in entry that is
profitable, timely, and effective. To help the court reach an economically
sound result, in other words, defendants would have to lay out a concrete
description of how successful entry into the government's market is likely
to happen, based on information available to an entrant. This description-a
business plan for the entrant-would entail the following showings.26
1. Necessary Sales
a. To Achieve Profitability
First, defendants would have to establish the amount of business an
entrant must capture in order to be profitable. The path to profitability must
result in this sales volume, if not more. This figure is critical because, as the
Guidelines emphasize, entry is unlikely to occur unless the entrant can se-
cure enough business to be profitable at premerger prices.269 Although no
court since 1992 has insisted that the government or the merging parties
establish this sales volume, 2 ° an analysis of the profitability of entry cannot
normally be conducted without it.271 By making it the first step in the path
to profitability, our approach would give it the emphasis it deserves, rein-
forcing the central position it occupies in the Guidelines' analysis.
b. To Promptly Restore Premerger Prices
The defendants would also have to show that this business strategy
would return prices and other terms to the premerger level within a rea-
sonably short period of time.272 The profitability question is not merely
268 For simplicity, we refer to the components of the defendants' burden-the elements of a path to
profitability-as what the defendants must show. In fact, the defendants need only introduce sufficient
evidence of a path to profitability to rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects created by the
government's concentration statistics. In making their prima facie case, moreover, the defendants would
have no duty to divulge confidential information or otherwise facilitate entry. Their obligation, if they
claim that entry is easy, is simply to back up this claim by explaining how a new firm (or an existing
firm in another market) is likely to be able, given the information at its disposal, to accomplish timely,
sufficient, and profitable entry. In Appendix B, we illustrate our approach by providing a hypothetical
example of a path to profitability.
269 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3 ("An entry alternative is likely if it would be
profitable at premerger prices .... ").
270 See supra Part II.B.3.b.iv.
271 For exceptions, see supra note 197.
272 Like the Guidelines, we would use two years as the standard measure of this period, though the
parties could introduce evidence that a longer or shorter period would be more appropriate. Moreover,
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whether new entry would be remunerative, but whether new entry that is
both timely and sufficient would be remunerative. Given the timeliness and
sufficiency criteria, moreover, the defendants' profitability analysis must
assume that the entrant would only receive elevated prices for a reasonably
short period of time.
This is an important constraint. In most instances, an entrant will not
be as efficient as the incumbents when it first enters the market. It may have
higher promotional and advertising costs for a time because consumers are
unfamiliar with its product. Its operating costs may be higher because it has
not achieved the same scale or operating experience as the incumbents. Its
capital costs may be higher because its risk of failure is perceived, at least
initially, as greater. If any of these barriers are present, its investment in
entry will not be profitable unless it can somehow recover those higher
costs.
There are three principal ways it could do so. First, it could quickly
win over a significant fraction of the incumbents' customers by offering
them a price that is below the postmerger level but above the premerger
level.273 This elevated price, if it is high enough and lasts long enough,
could enable the entrant to recover its higher initial costs. Second, the en-
trant could simply charge the premerger price if that price had enabled the
incumbents to earn above normal profits. That might be the case if the in-
cumbents had been exercising market power or if market conditions had
driven prices significantly above the incumbents' average total costs. In
either case, the premerger price could be high enough to permit the entrant
to recover its higher initial costs. Third, if production of the relevant prod-
uct exhibited economies of scale, the entrant could capture a sufficiently
large sales volume that its unit production costs were lowered enough to
compensate for its higher initial costs.274 In all events, the defendants would
have to show how the entrant could recover any higher costs it must tempo-
rarily incur to enter the relevant market.
2. Ability to Attain the Necessary Sales
The defendants' second major task is to show that an entrant following
the path to profitability would likely achieve the sales it needs to make
money and eliminate the merger's anticompetitive effects. To help resolve
the premerger price level should be understood not as the actual price level that prevailed prior to the
merger, but as the price level that would have prevailed absent the merger (the "but foe, price level). If
demand for the relevant product is growing, for example, the "but for" price level may be higher than
the price level on the date of the proposed merger.
273 Unless the entrant's product was superior to the incumbents' products, its price could not nor-
mally exceed the postmerger price and typically would have to be at least somewhat below it.
274 See Salop, supra note 15, app. at 567-70 (facing economies of scale, an entrant can recover its
initial promotional expenses and discounts by achieving a greater sales volume).
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that issue, the Guidelines identify several factors that affect the volume of
sales an entrant is likely to make.275 In the following sections, we describe
these and other factors in more detail.276
a. Future Market Growth or Decline
An entrant's ability to make money depends on its ability to capture
business and that in turn depends on the total amount of business available.
If that total is likely to grow in the future, the entrant's prospects are plainly
better than if the relevant market is likely to decline. Indeed, market growth
is one of the few theoretical factors that is strongly supported by empirical
evidence. According to Siegfried and Evans, "[m]arket growth is generally
measured by a historical rate of growth of industry sales revenue and has
been found by numerous researchers to have a positive effect on net en-
try. 277 In Swedish Match, Judge Hogan noted this factor, observing that
demand was "declining at a rate of two to three percent per year, a trend
which is expected to continue," and concluding, "[t]hus, there are fewer
sales opportunities for new entrants.""27 In their path to profitability, there-
fore, the defendants would have to forecast the trend of demand in the rele-
vant market for a reasonable period in the future, such as the five-year pe-
riod common in business plans.279
275 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3.
276 In these sections, we focus for simplicity on the quantity of sales an entrant can expect to make.
As we made clear earlier, however, what matters for the success and sufficiency of entry is not only the
number of units the entrant sells but the price at which it sells these units. The defendants' path to prof-
itability would have to specify both.
277 Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 128; see also id. at 129 ("Overall, there seems to be strong
support for the idea that market growth encourages entry."); accord John E. Kwoka, Non-Incumbent
Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and Prospective Competitors, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
173, 191 (2001) ("Entry into markets responds to larger expected profits and to rapid market growth.").
278 FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (D.D.C. 2000).
279 If there is substantial uncertainty about the future course of demand, it may be necessary to
address not only the expected trend in demand but the variability of that demand. The govemment may
be able to show, for example, that new entry is unlikely to occur even though demand is growing now
and is expected to continue to grow, because there is a material risk that demand would fall sharply in a
few years, causing the entrant to lose a significant sunk investment. See Carlton, Barriers to Entry,
supra note 68, at 607 ("[U]ncertainty and sunk costs influence the decision of whether to enter."); id. at
612 (stating that in the presence of uncertainty and sunk costs, firms "will be hesitant to enter an indus-
try even when price is currently high because price could subsequently fall"). Conversely, firms may
enter some markets even though demand is currently stagnant because there is a considerable chance
that demand will rise. See Barry C. Harris, Stuart Gurrea & Allison Ivory, Imperfect Information, Entry,
and the Merger Guidelines, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1589, 1609 (2008) (report-
ing that "rational entrants that... focus on variability of profits" may be "willing to enter despite low
average profits").
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b. Cost Structures
The entrant's costs affect the entrant's sales prospects in several ways.
If the entrant's costs are higher than the postmerger price, even for a time, it
will have to price below those costs in order to win business from the in-
cumbents. It will also have to recoup those losses in some way in order to
make an adequate return on its investment. If the entrant's costs are higher
than the incumbents' costs-in particular, if the entrant's avoidable costs
are higher than the incumbents' avoidable costs-the entrant is more likely
to experience an aggressive response by the incumbents, diminishing the
sales it is likely to make (or raising the costs of preserving the sales it
would have made)."'
To reflect these cost factors, the defendant's path to profitability must
compare the entrant's costs, initially and over time, with market prices and
the costs of the most significant incumbents, including themselves. In com-
paring their own costs to those of the entrant, they must ensure that their
cost representations are consistent with their efficiencies defense. If they
assert, for example, that the merger would enable them to reduce their aver-
age total costs by 10 percent, they would have to reflect this cost savings in
their description of their postmerger costs. Moreover, they would have to
reconcile the costs they assign the entrant with the cost levels they are in-
curring prior to the merger.
c. Reactions of Other Market Participants
i. Customers
An entrant's sales prospects depend directly on the willingness of cus-
tomers to shift their purchases from the incumbents to the entrant. In some
instances, moreover, one or more customers may be willing to sponsor new
entry, by providing financing or by making long-term commitments to pur-
280 An incumbent's avoidable costs are the costs it would have to incur to increase output in re-
sponse to the entrant. Since an entrant may have to make additional investments to survive in the mar-
ket, an entrant's avoidable costs are the costs it would have to incur to continue to produce output in the
market despite the incumbents' response.
As Harris, Gurrea, and Ivory stress, an entrant's information about the incumbents' costs is an im-
portant ingredient in its decision to enter: "Our brief review of the economics literature finds that a
firm's decision to enter can be significantly affected by the quality and completeness of its knowledge
about its competitors, especially information about its competitors' cost structure." Harris, Gurrea &
Ivory, supra note 279, at 1609. If the entrant believes, for example, that its own costs are lower than
those of the incumbents, it may "decide that it has the ability to out-compete incumbents or earn rents in
any postentry competition." Id. at 1602-03.
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chase significant quantities from the entrant.281 Entry sponsorship is likely
to be relatively rare, however, because of the collective action problem dis-
cussed above. 2 ' In brief, where customers are numerous and no single cus-
tomer purchases enough of the relevant product to make it worthwhile to
incur the costs of sponsoring entry, entry sponsorship will not occur unless
a critical mass of customers acts collectively. That is difficult to organize,
however, because each customer would prefer to free ride on the organizing
efforts of other customers. Entry sponsorship is most likely, therefore, when
individual customers are large enough to sponsor entry by themselves; that
is, when the input price reductions or other benefits they would enjoy as a
result of new entry exceed the costs they would incur in locating and sup-
porting a new entrant. Entry sponsorship may also occur when individual
customers solve their collective action problem and form a substantial
group purchasing organization. In Cardinal Health, Judge Sporkin found
that in two instances, group purchasing organizations created by retail
pharmacies had sponsored the entry of new wholesalers into their regions.283
More often, a new entrant will have to acquire the business it needs by
inducing customers to switch their purchases from the incumbents. Its abil-
ity to do so depends in part on the reactions of incumbents, discussed be-
low. It also depends on the strength of customer loyalty to the incumbents'
products, which affects how much the entrant will have to spend (in adver-
tising, price cuts, or other promotional efforts) to induce switching and the
pace at which switching is likely to occur. To estimate these values, the
defendants will have to examine past marketing campaigns in the relevant
market and similar markets, consult with marketing experts, and obtain the
views of customers, through surveys or testimony. In Swedish Match, Judge
Hogan looked at the historical record in the relevant market and concluded
that smaller firms "have had marginal success" in inducing consumers to
switch to new brands they introduced.284
ii. Incumbents
The reactions of incumbents influence both the number of sales the en-
trant is likely to make and the price at which it can make them. The princi-
281 The agencies have suggested that both customer willingness to shift and customer sponsorship
of entry are more likely when customers are industrial purchasers rather than individual consumers:
"Although many purchasers of differentiated consumer products are reluctant to switch from brands
they know and trust, purchasers of industrial commodities may be more likely to switch and be willing
to sponsor entry when they perceive a lack of competition." COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 42.
282 See supra text accompanying note 216.
283 See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 60, 67 n.18 (D.D.C. 1998).
284 FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (D.D.C. 2000). There was no evidence,
though, that these campaigns had followed a significant price increase by rivals. When that occurs, an
entrant should find it easier to induce customer switching. See supra Part l.B.3.b.v.(b).
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pal factor affecting all three variables (the entrant's unit sales, its price, and
the reactions of incumbents) is the elasticity of market demand. The more
elastic it is, the more units the entrant can sell without taking sales from the
incumbents, and the less market price will fall if the incumbents simply
maintain their unit sales. With more elastic demand, therefore, the impact of
entry on the incumbents' total revenues is likely to be smaller, making an
aggressive reaction by incumbents less likely. By contrast, with highly ine-
lastic demand, the entrant must take all its sales from the incumbents or
price will fall drastically, making a sharp reaction by the incumbents much
more likely. The elasticity of demand, in short, is a measure of how disrup-
tive entry will be for the incumbents.2"5 In most cases, both the defendants
and the government should be able to produce reasonably reliable estimates
of demand elasticity.
Another relevant and relatively easy to measure factor is the extent of
the incumbents' excess capacity. Incumbents are more likely to respond
aggressively to entry when they have significant excess capacity. In that
condition, their marginal costs are lower than when their capacity is fully
utilized, enabling them to expand output more cheaply. In Swedish Match,
Judge Hogan stated that because of their excess capacity, "existing loose
leaf producers could simply increase production as an effective competitive
response to new entrants." '286 More generally, the lower the marginal costs
of the incumbents, the more profitable it is for them to respond aggressively
to entry.
A potentially relevant factor is the need to incur substantial sunk costs
in order to participate in the market. McAfee, Mialon, and Williams argue
that such costs increase the credibility of an incumbent's threat to respond
aggressively, since they increase the losses the incumbent would incur if it
chose to exit rather than compete.287 As many commentators have noted,
however, substantial sunk costs also make exit more costly for the entrant,
285 As Professor Carstensen emphasized to us, another significant measure is the likely course of
future demand, discussed above. If demand is growing substantially, entry is less disruptive because an
entrant can more easily gain the business it needs from entirely new customers rather than from custom-
ers of the incumbents. The disruptiveness of entry is also a function of its scale. As we noted earlier, the
larger the entrant's minimum viable scale, the greater the threat to the incumbents' revenues. As a result,
"established competitors are more likely to respond to large-scale entry with price cuts." Salop, supra
note 15, at 561; see also id. at 563-64 (finding an incumbent response more likely "when the market
structure ... in the industry makes pricing coordination after entry more difficult").
286 Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
287 McAfee, Mialon & Williairs, supra note 68, at 463. The authors state:
Sunk costs generate earnings that would be lost ifa firm exits the market; in this sense, sunk
costs are exit barriers. Exit barriers can affect entry by influencing the incentives of incum-
bents. If incumbents cannot exit without considerable losses, then their threats of aggressive
post-entry behavior are more credible, which deters entry and cams them higher profit.
Id. The three economists also note that "sunk costs increase an entrant's losses in the event that entry
fails, which makes the incumbent's threats of aggressive post-entry behavior more frightening." Id.
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increasing its willingness to remain in the market.288 Once entry has oc-
cuffed, therefore, and both the entrant and the incumbents have incurred
substantial sunk costs, the presence of these costs should not influence the
likelihood of an aggressive incumbent reaction. Indeed, because these costs
are sunk, they would not enter into the incumbent's calculation of the
profit-maximizing response to entry. Instead of focusing on sunk costs, it
seems more useful to examine the characteristics of post-entry competition
between the entrant and the incumbents. As we noted earlier, if the entrant
needs to make additional investments in order to attain minimum viable
scale, incumbents may react aggressively in order to deter those invest-
ments. An aggressive reaction may also make sense if it would create a
reputation for aggression that would deter future entry in the relevant mar-
ket or related markets. Incumbents may also react sharply if they know that
the entrant cannot survive without additional capital from outside sources
and that these sources might not supply it if they cannot easily determine
whether the reaction is likely to persist. As these possibilities suggest, pre-
dicting the reactions of incumbents is similar to determining whether an
incumbent is likely to engage in predatory pricing. Since there is now a
considerable literature on the profitability of predation,289 it should be pos-
sible for the parties and ultimately the court to make a reasonable prediction
of the incumbents' response to entry, based on the obvious factors noted
above (demand elasticity, demand growth or decline, incumbents' excess
capacity, and entrant's minimum viable scale) as well as the considerations
identified in the predation literature. 9 °
C. The Government's Burden of Proof: High Entry Barriers
If the defendants establish a prima facie case of easy entry, the gov-
ernment would have the opportunity to rebut that case and, in accord with
Baker Hughes,29" ' would bear the ultimate burden of proof on the issue. In
order to carry this burden, the government would have to identify the bar-
288 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 12, at 357 ("Committed entrants, in contrast, are in for the long
haul. Once they enter, they expect to stay because to abandon the market would mean walking away
from a substantial sunk investment.").
289 See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 212, at 2285-2328 (summarizing theories of rational
predation validated by the recent economic literature, including "Financial Market Predation" and
"Reputation Effect Predation").
290 The empirical literature on entry appears to be less helpful. According to Geroski as well as
Siegfried and Evans, it shows that incumbents are more likely to respond to entry by stepping up adver-
tising than by cutting prices. Neither suggests, however, that the literature has produced bright-line
criteria for determining when an aggressive response is likely. See Geroski, supra note 60, at 433-34;
Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 134-36.
291 United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also supra Part
II1.A (quoting the Baker Hughes test).
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rier or barriers that would make new entry untimely, unlikely, or insuffi-
cient. With respect to each barrier or combination of barriers, moreover, the
government would have to explain why it would render entry inadequate to
solve the merger's competitive problems. As the courts do now, therefore,
the government would have to identify the existence of entry barriers, but
unlike most judicial analysis, the government would also have to show-
with economically valid theories and a preponderance of the evidence-that
these barriers are sufficiently large and long lasting that they would fore-
stall reasonably prompt elimination of the merger's anticompetitive ef-
fects.292
In some cases, showing such difficult entry would be straightforward,
as when a statute precludes new entry or technological factors make it im-
possible to accomplish within a few years. In other cases, though, the gov-
ernment will have to combine several barriers, such as scale economies,
brand loyalty, and aggressive pricing by incumbents, to make out an eco-
nomically valid case of entry deterrence. For example, the government's
economic expert might testify that, because of scale economies, an entrant
cannot be profitable at the premerger price level unless it captures 10 per-
cent of the relevant market. Because of loyalty to the incumbents' brands,
however, an entrant cannot win that much business unless it can offer a
price significantly below the incumbents' prices for at least a year. Finally,
because of incumbents' past responses to entry, there is no basis for believ-
ing that an entrant could price below them for a year. To the contrary,
whenever an entrant has experienced significant sales growth, the incum-
bents have matched its prices within six months of its entry. If the govern-
ment could support such testimony with convincing evidence, it could es-
tablish that new entry was unlikely.
D. Other Probative Evidence
As in the example just described, the parties would attempt to carry
their respective burdens with direct evidence of the existence and height of
entry barriers and the profitability of entry. In addition, they could intro-
duce indirect evidence such as the history of entry, the plans of potential
292 In our framework we use the term "barriers to entry" as the courts have used the term-to refer
to an obstacle that makes entry less timely, less likely, or less effective, not as an obstacle that necessar-
ily and by itself renders entry untimely, unlikely, or insufficient. In order to prove that entry is difficult,
therefore, the government would not only have to identify entry barriers as we define the term but also
establish their height. As the Guidelines indicate, moreover, new entry would not deter or counteract the
merger's anticompetitive effects if it failed any of the three tests of timeliness, likelihood, and suffi-
ciency. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.0 (explaining that entry is not easy unless it passes
all three tests). The government would carry its burden of proof, therefore, if it shows that entry barriers
are high enough to render entry inadequate on any of these dimensions.
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entrants, and the defendants' own evaluations of the difficulty of entry. In
this section, we discuss the proper interpretation of such indirect evidence.
1. History of Entry
Past attempts to enter the relevant market may help a court evaluate
the claim that entry is likely to occur in the future if the merged firm im-
poses a significant anticompetitive price increase.
a. Past Successful Entry
If several firms have entered the relevant market in the past and sur-
vived, it is tempting to conclude that the relevant market has no entry barri-
ers. In fact, this may not establish that future entry would promptly counter-
act a postmerger price increase. Past entry may have taken considerable
time to accomplish, or the entrants may have remained too small to cause
the incumbents to lower their prices or improve their other terms. For that
reason, Professor Schmalensee states: "In general, a clear signal of low
barriers is provided only by effective, viable entry that takes a nontrivial
market share." '293 Moreover, past entry may have occurred under quite dif-
ferent market conditions. As a result, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise de-
clares: "The only truly reliable evidence of low barriers is repeated past
entry in circumstances similar to current conditions." '294
Determining whether market conditions are similar is a relatively easy
task. To facilitate it, the Antitrust Section's monograph on market power
contains a checklist of ten items, covering such factors as whether past en-
trants were "particularly well-positioned to enter the market because they
had access to a scarce asset necessary for entry (which future entrants may
not have)" and whether "the previous entrants caused industry capacity to
grow to the point where additional entry would lead to substantial excess
capacity, making future entry substantially more risky and less likely than
was previously the case." '295 Determining whether past entry occurred under
circumstances similar to current conditions is useful not only because it
establishes the precedential value of past entry, but also because it improves
the assessment of current entry conditions. As Professor Baker points out, a
293 Schmalensee, supra note 177, at 45. Professor Schmalensee's evidentiary standard focuses on
the sufficiency of past entry. The timeliness of past entry must also be assessed.
294 2B AREEDA-HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, 420b, at 74. The treatise goes on to state: "Indeed,
repeated entry during a period of competitive prices makes entry even more likely in response to future
attempts at monopoly pricing." Id. That may not be true, however, since the factors that encouraged
entry to occur "during a period of competitive prices" (e.g., rapid demand growth and a fragmented
market) may not be present after the merger.
295 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 137-38.
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careful analysis of past entry inevitably turns into an analysis of the likeli-
hood of current entry.296
b. Absence of Previous Entry
The absence of past entry does not, by itself, indicate that the market is
protected by high barriers to entry. Entry may not have occurred in the past
because the firms in the market were charging competitive prices and earn-
ing normal profits. In Heinz, the district court overlooked this. It concluded
that entry was "difficult and improbable, 297 in part because there "have
been no significant entries into the baby food market in decades," 12 98 but it
did not determine whether two of the incumbents, Heinz and Beech-Nut,
had merely been earning competitive returns during this period. These in-
cumbents were critical because the baby food market was divided between
a dominant firm, Gerber, whose products supermarkets invariably carried,
and two firms, Heinz and Beech-Nut, who often competed for the right to
occupy the "second shelf' position in the baby food section.2 99 The real
entry issue in the case was whether there would be new entry into the "sec-
ond shelf' segment if Heinz and Beech-Nut merged and raised prices.3"'
The absence of past entry into this segment would not be determinative if
the segment had been intensely competitive, as might have been the case.
The court of appeals indicated that the segment was currently quite com-
petitive.3"'
296 Baker, supra note 15, at 205. He states:
Can entrants today employ the same approaches as had been successful in the past? Can they
do so as cheaply as did the earlier entrants? Would entrants today reasonably expect to re-
ceive as high a price as did their predecessors, who may have entered when there was less
post-entry competition or the market was larger? As these questions suggest, careful analysis
of the probative value of past examples of committed entry will quickly tam into an entry
likelihood analysis ....
Id. Because a few examples of past entry would not, without more, resolve the entry issue, Professors
Baker and Shapiro declare:
But the mere presence of some examples of entry, in which the entrants have not (yet) exited
the market, should not form a basis for embracing the view that entry will solve any competi-
tive problems caused by the merger, especially when the shares of the merging firms are
large and those of the entrants are small.
Baker & Shapiro, supra note 50, at 255; see also id. ("In markets with differentiated products, the fact
that entry has proven possible in one segment, such as the low-price segment, does not imply that entry
would be profitable in another segment.").
297 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D.D.C. 2000), rev 'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
298 Id.
299 Id. at 192-93.
300 See id.
301 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 718-19 ("Competition between Heinz and Beech-Nut to gain accounts at the
wholesale level is fierce with each contest concluding in a winner-take-all result."). The district court's
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The absence of past entry was entitled to greater weight in Swedish
Match because Judge Hogan found that the incumbents had been charging
supracompetitive prices and earning above-normal profits." 2 Even in these
circumstances, however, the lack of past entry was not decisive because the
government was challenging the merger on the ground that it would raise
prices above existing levels." 3 Although past entry had not eroded existing
prices, future entry might still prevent an increase in those prices.
In Cardinal Health, Judge Sporkin's analysis of the significance of the
lack of past entry was spotty. At one point, he correctly recognized that the
absence of historical entry had no bearing on the height of current barriers
because the industry's past behavior had been competitive.0 n At other
points, however, he ignored this principle. He stated that several regional
wholesalers had failed to achieve significant expansion on the national level
because of the "economies of scale and strength of reputation" of the merg-
ing parties.30 5 Yet if he was correct that the defendants had been pricing
competitively in the past, their performance, not barriers to expansion,
could explain the wholesalers' failure to expand. He also concluded that
certain distributors of related products were unlikely to enter the relevant
market because they had declined an offer to supply a large HMO with
pharmaceuticals.3 6 That offer was made, however, when market prices
were competitive. If the challenged mergers caused prices to rise, the dis-
tributors' incentive to enter the market would increase.
c. Past Exits
Judge Hogan's opinion in Staples provides an excellent illustration of
the role of previous exits in establishing the likelihood of postmerger entry.
After noting that "all office superstore entrants have entered within the last
11 years, ' ' he stressed that the vast majority of them had failed:
[T]he recent trend for office superstores has actually been toward exiting the market rather
than entering. Over the past few years, the number of office superstore chains has dramati-
error did not affect the ultimate resolution of the case because the defendants did not contest the entry
issue. See Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
302 See FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168 & n.13 (D.D.C. 2000) (existing smoke-
less tobacco producers eamed "high margins and profits" and engaged in "coordinated pricing").
303 Id. at 170-71.
304 FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Given the highly competi-
tive environment in the industry over the past two decades, the lack of entry in the past cannot necessar-
ily be considered a reliable indicator of entry in the future should the competitive environment
change.").
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1087 (D.D.C. 1997).
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cally dropped from twenty-three to three. All but Staples, Office Depot, and OfficeMax have
either closed or been acquired. The failed office superstore entrants include very large, well-
known retail establishments such as Kmart, Montgomery Ward, Ames, and Zayres.30'
This shakeout was significant. Whether these firms failed because they
chose a retail format or product selection that consumers regarded as infe-
rior, or because they were undercapitalized, poorly managed, or operated at
too small a scale, the widespread failures suggested that entry was difficult.
Although Judge Hogan did not identify the reasons why most entrants
failed, he pinpointed the causes of Office 1 's failure:
By the end of 1994, Office I had 17 stores, and grew to 35 stores operating in II Midwestern
states as of October 1], 1996. As of that date, Office I was the fourth largest office supply
superstore chain in the United States. Unfortunately, also as of that date, Office I filed for
Chapter II bankruptcy protection. Brad Zenner, President of Office 1, testified through dec-
laration, that Office I failed because it was severely undercapitalized in comparison with the
industry leaders, Staples, Office Depot, and OfficeMax. In addition, Mr. Zenner testified that
when the three leaders ultimately expanded into the smaller markets where Office I stores
were located, they seriously undercut Office I's retail prices and profit margins. Because Of-
fice I lacked the capitalization of the three leaders and lacked the economies of scale enjoyed
by those competitors, Office I could not remain profitable.
309
Neither of these deficiencies-lack of capital and lack of scale-would
necessarily make future entry unsuccessful. In the event of a significant,
anticompetitive, postmerger price increase, a firm with the requisite capital
might be able to acquire the necessary scale soon enough to be profitable.
Narrowly, therefore, all Office 1's failure indicates is that profitable entry
requires greater capital and greater scale than Office 1 possessed. More
broadly, however, the failure of so many entrants, even large, well-known
entrants, surely casts doubt on the likelihood of postmerger entry.
2. Most Likely Potential Entrants
Some firms may be better positioned than others to enter the relevant
market. They may, for example, already manufacture similar products, ena-
bling them to expand their production facilities with less capital than a start
up needs to produce the relevant product from scratch."' Moreover, when
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 For other characteristics of relatively well-positioned entrants, see Kwoka, supra note 277, at
193-94, 201. For another, more extensive discussion of the potential competition doctrine, see Darren
Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WiS. L. REV. 1035.
Bush and Massa point out that a firm is not only particularly well-positioned to enter a market but likely
to do so if it has taken substantial steps toward entry: "Sunk cost investments for entry, customer con-
tracts, bids, entry plans, and other firm documents, such as e-mails, memos or consultant reports dis-
cussing entry, are all strong evidence of entry." Id. at 1143. These investments-in physical capital,
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an existing firm enters a new market by building a new plant, the empirical
literature indicates that it tends to enter at a larger scale, grow more quickly,
and survive more often than a start up.31' On average, therefore, the most
effective entrants appear to be existing firms who diversify into new mar-
kets by erecting new plants. Not all existing firms, however, are probable
entrants. The most likely entrants are firms whose products or production
methods would enable them to enter more cheaply or otherwise more suc-
cessfully than other firms.
When such firms can be identified, evidence about them is particularly
relevant to the entry question.' First, their internal evaluations of the feasi-
bility or profitability of entry may be entitled to significant weight, at least
if they were prepared prior to learning of the proposed merger.312 Second,
the testimony of their executives may also be helpful, although it may be
distorted by an interest in the outcome of the litigation. For example, if a
firm produces a somewhat substitutable product, its executives may exag-
gerate their willingness to enter the relevant market in hopes of inducing the
court to allow a merger that would raise prices and increase demand for
their own product. Conversely, firms may falsely claim they would not en-
ter the relevant market because they fear that the challenged merger would
increase competition and make their subsequent entry less successful. In
both Oracle and Cardinal Health, the testimony of executives of potential
entrants was considered without noting such possible bias.313 Finally, when
the defendants can identify one or more potential entrants, their path to
profitability would normally be based on the characteristics of these firms.
customer relations, and business strategy-increase the likelihood of entry because they make it less
expensive and less risky. They may also indicate that the firm has decided to enter.
311 See Siegfried & Evans, supra note 85, at 122 (citing Timothy Dunne, Mark J. Roberts & Larry
Samuelson, Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 19 RAND J. ECON. 495
(1988)); see also Tor, supra note 44, at 494-96 (reviewing other evidence).
312 If a firm has not only considered entry, but decided on it, its plans may be especially informa-
tive. In that case, however, the Guidelines would count the firm as a participant in the relevant market,
not as a potential entrant. See MERGER GUIDELtNES, supra note 13, § 3.2 n.27 ("Firms which have
committed to entering the market prior to the merger generally will be included in the measurement of
the market."). In United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y
1997), Judge Spatt did not follow this aspect of the Guidelines. He treated two hospitals as entrants into
the government's market, not as participants, even though they were planning to enter that market
whether or not the merger took place. See id. at 149 ("[T]he Court foresees a new and emerging 'entry'
in the relevant product and geographic markets, namely, New York Hospital Queens .... If not already,
it will shortly be a meaningful presence in Queens County, a major part of the relevant geographic
market."). When a firm's entry plans are clear, it seems better to include that firm in the market, rather
than consider it in the entry section of the case, since the likelihood of its entry does not have to be
determined.
313 See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1142-44, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(discussing testimony of Microsoft vice president that it would not enter the government's market); FTC
v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) (explicating testimony of two regional
wholesalers that "they have made no plans to expand in response to any postlnerger pricing practices").
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3. Defendants' Assessments
In FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc.,314 the court noted that "Alliant it-
self has assessed the probability of new entry after the merger at only 5
percent."3 5 Although such an assessment is likely to be rare-Alliant is the
only decision we reviewed that refers to one-it could be highly probative.
If a defendant predicts that entry would not occur even though the merger
would have anticompetitive consequences, its assessment is likely to be
genuine. Similarly, Judge Sporkin found it "compelling"3"6 in Cardinal
Health that two of the defendants' chief executives had indicated that con-
solidation of the industry would lead to more "rational pricing," an adverse
effect that could not persist unless entry was impeded.31 7 At the same time,
an assertion that entry is unlikely should not be decisive where the defen-
dant did not claim that the merger would produce higher prices or other
anticompetitive consequences.318
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law would have little purpose if barriers to entry did not ex-
ist, since even monopolists could not exploit their customers if new entrants
would immediately lure them away. Judges now realize this and would not
enjoin a merger of competitors without finding that the relevant market has
entry barriers. Judicial analysis of the entry issue, however, has lagged be-
hind developments in economics and the Merger Guidelines. These devel-
opments have identified the basic questions that need to be asked in assess-
ing whether new entry is likely to eliminate a merger's anticompetitive ef-
fects, but judges typically do not ask these questions. Since the entry sec-
tion of the Guidelines was revised in 1992, for example, there have been
thirty-five decisions in litigated merger cases, and none of them determined
the minimum amount of business an entrant needs to be profitable at the
premerger price level.
Instead of addressing the profitability of entry, most courts try to re-
solve the entry question by asking whether barriers to entry exist. This ap-
314 808 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1992).
315 ld. at 21.
316 Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
317 See id. at 64 (noting that the CEO of one defendant wrote that "pricing is not rational" and
"[t]here is too much capacity now," and another told his board that the merger of two other competitors
"will be positive for industry conditions in that excess capacity will be removed").
318 This was the case in FTC v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009). Defendants had
told investors and ratings agencies that barriers were high and entry unlikely. Id. at 49-50. However, the
industry was by all accounts "highly competitive," and defendants had not predicted that the merger
would change this. See id. at 59-60.
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proach is often inadequate, however, because the courts view an entry bar-
rier as any obstacle that makes entry less likely, less quick, or less effective.
Even if such an obstacle is significant, it may not be enough, alone or in
combination with other obstacles, to render entry unlikely or untimely or
insufficient. High capital requirements, for instance, may make entry less
likely without making it unlikely. To be sure, the courts' focus on entry
barriers does work when they correctly determine that there are no signifi-
cant obstacles to entry, for in that circumstance, an anticompetitive post-
merger price increase is likely to induce quick and effective entry. Even
here, however, there were problems: some decisions concluded that there
were no barriers to entry simply because certain firms had the ability to
enter the market. The proper question, though, is not whether these firms
could enter the market but whether they would do so, a question that nor-
mally cannot be answered without examining the profitability of entry.
Courts are reluctant to address the profitability of entry directly be-
cause, as many commentators have recognized, the issue is difficult for
them. Unlike the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise, however, we do not believe
the issue is beyond the capacity of generalist judges-if they are given a
practical method of resolving it. This Article provides such a method, com-
bining the Guidelines' emphasis on the profitability of entry with the
courts' focus on entry barriers. Under our approach, if the defendants con-
tend that entry is easy, they would have the burden of producing substantial
evidence that entry would meet all three of the Guidelines' criteria-
timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency. In order to discharge this burden,
moreover, they would have to identify a "path to profitability"-a business
strategy that is likely to enable an entrant both to achieve profitability and
to grow quickly enough to drive prices and other terms back to the
premerger level in a reasonably short period of time. If the defendants sup-
ply such evidence, the government would have the ultimate burden of proof
on the entry issue and would have to show not only that the relevant market
is protected by one or more entry barriers but that these barriers are large
enough-in size and duration-to prevent new entry from satisfying all the
Guidelines' criteria.
By adopting this framework, courts are likely to improve the rigor and
reliability of entry analysis without rendering it unmanageable. This ap-
proach would focus the parties and the court on the correct economic ques-
tions and require the parties to supply better evidence on these questions. At
the same time, the process is likely to be workable. It is easy to understand,
it is concrete and structured, it assigns the parties distinct but complimen-
tary burdens, and it draws on well-established principles of economics that
are reflected in the Guidelines and explained in this Article. While the supe-
riority of this approach cannot be definitively established without trying it,
the current approach, which is too frequently cursory, too poorly linked to
economic theory, and too likely to be inaccurate, should be reformed.
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APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MERGER CASES SINCE
THE 1992 GUIDELINES
Case Anticompetitive Not Anticompetitive
FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., "
605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C.
2009).
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., "
Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., - FTC's product
Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 market rejected
(D.D.C. 2007), rev'd, 548 - Entry may be un-
F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). timely
- Expansion easy
Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. /
FTC, 534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir.
2008).
FTC v. Foster, No. CIV 07- • Anticompetitive
352 JBACT, 2007 WL effects unlikely
1793441 (D.N.M. May 29, • Entry and expan-
2007). sion easy
FTC v. Equitable Res., Inc., • Competitive issues
512 F. Supp. 2d 361 (W.D. not resolved; state
Pa. 2007). action doctrine ap-
plies
- Entry not discussed
United States v. Dairy Farm- "
ers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d (summary
850 (6th Cir. 2005), rev 'g judgment for
No. Civ.A. 03-206KSF, defendant re-
2004 WL 2186215 (E.D. Ky. versed)
last filing Sept. 7, 2004).
United States v. Oracle • DOJ's product
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 market rejected
(N.D. Cal. 2004). * DOJ's geographic
market rejected
* Entry easy
FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 • Postmerger coor-
F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C.), dination unlikely
voluntarily dismissed, Nos. * Entry difficult
04-5291, 04-7120, 2004 WL
2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15,
2004) (per curiam).
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United States v. UPM- V
Kymmene Oyj, No. 03 C
2528, 2003 WL 21781902
(N.D. Ill. July 25, 2003).
FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. "
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
United States v. Sungard e DOJ's product
Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. market rejected
2d 172 (D.D.C. 2001). ° Entry not discussed
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 V
F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 • Anticompetitive
F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. effects unlikely
2000), rev 'd, 246 F.3d 708 e Efficiencies likely
(D.C. Cir. 2001). ° Entry difficult
FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 "
F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C.
2000).
United States v. Franklin V
Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d
1025 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
FTC v. Tenet Health Care • FTC's geographic
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th market rejected
Cir. 1999). • Entry not discussed
(district court de-
termined it was un-
likely)
FTC v. Tenet Healthcare V
Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937
(E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 186
F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
FTC v. Cardinal Health, V
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34
(D.D.C. 1998).
Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. DR V/
Partners, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th
Cir. 1998).
Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. V
Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp.
1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995),
aff'd sub nom. Cmty. Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. DR Partners,
139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir.
1998).
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United States v. Engelhard • DOJ's product
Corp., 126 F.3d 1302 (1 1th market rejected
Cir. 1997). • Entry not discussed
United States v. Engelhard • DOJ's product
Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463 market rejected
(M.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd, 126 - Entry not discussed
F.3d 1302 (llth Cir. 1997).
FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
United States v. Long Island • DOJ's product
Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. market rejected
Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). * Entry easy
FTC v. Butterworth Health • Efficiencies likely
Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 • Anticompetitive
(W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'dper effects unlikely be-
curiam without published cause of commu-
opinion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th nity control
Cir. 1997). • Entry and expan-
sion difficult
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. • Competitive issues
FTC, 85 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. not reached; Soft
1996). Drink Interbrand
Act should have
been applied
• Entry not discussed
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 • FTC's geographic
F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). market rejected
* Entry not discussed
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 • FTC's geographic
F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. market rejected
1995), aff'd, 69 F.3d 260 • Entry difficult
(8th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Mercy • DOJ's geographic
Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. market rejected
968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), va- e Entry easy
catedas moot, 107 F.3d 632
(8th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Gillette Co., • DOJ's product
828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. market rejected
1993). - Entry and expan-
sion easy
Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos., • FTC improperly
Inc. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859 rejected failing
(D.C. Cir. 1993). company defense
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* Entry not discussed
(district court de-
termined entry
would be more dif-
ficult after the
merger)
Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos., V
Inc. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp.
762 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 991 F.2d
859 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d "
1295 (9th Cir. 1993).
FTC v. Alliant Techsystems V
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1992).
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APPENDIX B: THE PATH TO PROFITABILITY-A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE
In a contested merger the defense can rebut the government's case by
showing that entry would be profitable and on a sufficient scale to drive
prices to the premerger level within a reasonably short period of time. Un-
der our proposed approach, the defense would have to make this showing
by identifying a "path to profitability," a business strategy that is likely to
make entry both profitable for the entrant and effective in promptly elimi-
nating the merger's anticompetitive effects. In this Appendix, we provide a
hypothetical illustration of a path to profitability.
As we have discussed, this path would be determined by the following four
elements:
(1) necessary sales;
(2) future market growth or decline;
(3) the cost structure; and
(4) reactions of incumbents and customers.
Information to determine the path can be obtained in part from industry
history that would include past success or failure of entry, the reaction of
incumbents to entry, and the minimum necessary scale for survival. Infor-
mation may be obtained from examining previous price data and from
models of industry behavior.
We make the assumption that there would be no imports in response to any
price increase. In the simplest case, however, the defense might be able to
show that such importation would be profitable for foreign firms after a 5%
or greater increase in price. The defense might furnish affidavits or testi-
mony from one or more foreign firms that their shipments would be suffi-
cient to bring back the price of widgets to the premerger level.
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") challenges the merger of two
widget companies, DEF and KLM. The FTC contends this merger would
result in a substantial increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI")
and a sustained price increase that new entry would not defeat. Entry is
unlikely to occur according to the FTC because (1) capital requirements are
large, (2) consumers are reluctant to switch to the products of new firms as
reliability is important to them, and (3) it is time consuming to design a new
competing widget. We agree that capital requirements are large and that
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reliability is important. We do not agree that it is time consuming to design
a new widget. Previous experience within the industry has shown that ex-
pense can be substituted for time so that by incurring extra expense a new
and viable design can be rather quickly produced. We show here that the
profits to be gained from entry are adequate to induce timely and sufficient
entry in spite of the barriers to entering the widget market. In particular,
entry would occur on a scale such that the postmerger price would be ap-
proximately equal to the premerger price in the second year after the
merger. By the beginning of the third year, the market price would return to
the premerger level. To show this, we demonstrate a path to profitability
that forecasts prices and market shares as well as the profits to be made by a
new entrant.
The premerger market shares of the industry firms along with the HHI
index are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
PREMERGER MARKET SHARES, REVENUES, AND HHI
Firm Market Share Revenues HHI
ABC 28% 215.6 784
DEF 25% 192.5 625
HIJ 14% 107.8 196
KLM 10% 77.0 100
NOP 8% 61.6 64
RST 8% 61.6 64
XYZ 7% 53.9 49
Sum 100% 770 1882
The FTC's calculations of market share and the HHI index after the
merger are shown in Table 2. The merger of the second and fourth largest
firm would, taken alone, create an HHI of 2382, an increase of 500 points.
These statistics exceed the Guidelines' thresholds both as regards the post-
merger concentration and the increase in the HHI.
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Table 2
MARKET SHARES, REVENUES, AND HHI IMMEDIATELY AFTER
MERGER
Firm Market Share Revenues HHI
ABC 28% 215.6 784
DEF 35% 269.5 1225
HIJ 14% 107.8 196
KLM 0 0 0
NOP 8% 61.6 64
RST 8% 61.6 64
XYZ 7% 53.9 49
Sum 100% 770 2382
EFFECTS ON PRICE
In this analysis, we assume the FTC has correctly predicted changes in
price and costs for the first year following the merger. A simple price-
concentration relationship, derived from past data, suggests that the per-
centage price increase would correspond to the percentage increase in the
HHI raised to the 0.3 power over the likely range. This yields results similar
to those of the FTC. The current price for widgets is around $1.00 each,
with variation for quality differences. In the price analysis we use the price
for the median quality widget. The price increase after the merger as esti-
mated by the FTC and by our model would be 7%.
This price increase, however, is only the immediate effect of the
merger. The FTC calculations fail to take into account the effects of indus-
try growth on the revenues of existing firms and the effect of entry on the
predicted price increase. By the end of two years, entry pursuant to the path
to profitability we identify would bring the HHI to just over the premerger
figure and would cause prices to fall to the premerger level.
THE MINIMUM VIABLE SCALE
A new entrant would be viable only if it enters at the minimum viable
scale ("MVS") or grows to that scale within a few years. The MVS is 10%
of premerger industry revenues. This is $77 million calculated as follows.
Total industry revenues are $770 million. The entrant must cover capital
costs of $20 million (which includes the extra cost of widget design) plus
$3 million in normal profit (15% of capital costs) for fixed costs of $23
million on an annualized basis. Variable costs would run 70% of gross
revenues. Thus, the operating profit would be 30% and total revenues
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would need to be at least $77 million (30% of $77 million = $23 million) to
cover fixed and variable costs.
Our forecasts indicate that industry sales in two years would be $1,023
million. This amounts to an increase of 15.3% per year. This is the rate pre-
dicted by the Widget Industry Trade Association. The three smaller existing
firms have counted on industry growth (as well as an increase in market
share in the case of XYZ) to reach an efficient scale.
BUSINESS PLAN
The five year business plan for the new entrant is shown in Table 3. In
order to attract new business, the entrant QG would offer customers a 15%
discount for the first two years. After that QG would be able to command
the average price charged by the incumbents. We forecast that sales for QG
would grow at 5% during the second year of its operation and at 6% in the
years thereafter. This is significantly less than the industry growth rate,
which is about 15% for the first two years and 10% thereafter. Thus, we
assume that the growth in sales for QG is less than the average for the in-
dustry. Variable costs for QG increase at just over 5% per year. We regard
these as conservative assumptions. We project that while QG would lose
money over the first two years, it would have a net profit of $5 million over
the five-year planning period after covering capital costs (including a nor-
mal return) and that its profit would be $2 million in net present value
terms, using a discount rate of 15%, which is generally regarded as the hur-
dle rate for firms in this industry.
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Table 3
FIVE YEAR BUSINESS PLAN FOR THE ENTRANT
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5
Price 1.00 1.07 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
Revenue
Required
For MVS no entry 77.00 77.00 77.00 77.00 77.00
Forecast
Sales no entry 70.68 74.21 78.67 83.39 87.56
Capital
Cost Annu-
alized no entry 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
Variable
Costs no entry 49.48 51.95 54.55 57.82 60.71
Total Costs no entry 69.48 71.95 74.55 77.82 80.71
Operating
Profit no entry 21.20 22.26 24.12 25.57 26.84
Accounting
Profit or
Loss no entry 1.20 2.26 4.12 5.57 6.84
Profit Re-
quired for
Competi-
tive Return: no entry 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Economic
Profit or
Loss no entry -1.80 -0.74 1.12 2.57 3.84
Present
Value of
Economic NPV
Profit (dis- Over 5
counted at Years:
15%) 2.00 -1.56 -0.56 0.74 1.47 1.91
Industry 1362.4
Revenues 770.00 888.58 1023.64 1126.01 1238.61 7
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SUFFICIENCY OF ENTRY
The business plan shows that entry is profitable over a five-year plan-
ning period. The price increase after the merger is that predicted by the
FTC, which is consistent with our model. That model predicts that the entry
of QG would result in a price decrease to nearly the premerger level in the
second year after the merger. The effect of the entry of QG on the industry
in year two is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
MARKET SHARES, REVENUES, AND HHI IN THE SECOND YEAR
AFTER THE MERGER
Firm Market Share* Revenues HHI Price
ABC 20% 204.73 400 1.01
DEF 33% 337.80 1089 1.01
HIJ 15% 153.55 225 1.01
KLM 0 0.00 0 1.01
NOP 8% 76.77 64 1.01
RST 8% 81.89 64 1.01
XYZ 1.01
9% 92.13 81
QG 0.86
7% 74.21 49
Sum 100% 1023.64 1972
*The numbers in this column are rounded off so that revenues do not corre-
spond exactly to market shares.
These market share predictions take into account entry, industry
growth, and the relative expansion and contraction of the existing firms. All
firms except the new entrant would have reached the MVS. By the follow-
ing year, QG would have reached this scale. The largest firm, ABC, has the
oldest equipment and is likely to lose market share over the next two years,
as it has done in recent years. HIJ, the most recent previous entrant with the
most modem equipment, has been the fastest growing firm and should be
able to maintain or expand market share. These predictions accord with the
testimony of industry experts. Full efficiencies from upgraded equipment
and the merger should be felt after two years and would exert additional
downward pressure on price, reducing it to the premerger level by the start
of year three.
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LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY
Profits Are Attractive for Entry
Even without the merger, the existing firms with greater than 10% of
current revenue appear to make excess profits. Their profit rates are slightly
greater than firms with less than 10% of revenues and greater than firms in
other related industries with similar risk characteristics. The larger firms
ABC and DEF currently make 16% on equity as reported in their annual
reports. This is greater than the 14% made by firms in other industries that
are in the same risk class. HIJ, the newest firm, is currently making 18% on
equity. The smaller firms, with the exception of XYZ, are making 14% on
equity.
With the predicted price increase, profits would increase. Our model
predicts that profits would grow for all firms at about the percentage deter-
mined by the natural log of the price increase. With a price increase of 6%,
then, profits would increase by about 1.8%. The new profit figures for the
various firms would be as shown in Table 5.
Table 5
PREDICTED RATES OF PROFIT
Current Profit Rate* Predicted Profit Rate
18 19.8
16 17.8
14 15.8
* Derived from annual reports and SEC fil-
ings of all listed companies
Since the current profit rates also existed at the time of the entry of HIJ
and since the industry is growing, entry is likely to occur even without the
merger. With the merger, profit rates for all firms increase and are substan-
tially above comparable rates for firms of similar risk characteristics. Entry
at about the scale of HIJ would be able, at a minimum, to repeat the experi-
ence of HIJ.
The Merged Firm Would Have Lower Costs and This Would Put Down-
ward Pressure on Price
The FTC agrees that there are operating economies that would be
achieved from the merger. This would reduce the effect of greater market
power, as it would put downward pressure on price. The FTC's calculations
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(and ours) show that this would reduce the postmerger price increase from
7% to 6% by the end of year one. This price decline would by no means
deter entry. By the beginning of year three, the full achievement of the
merger's efficiencies and the growth of QG would depress price to the
premerger level.
The Reaction of Incumbents
The reaction of incumbents to other entry, including the entry of HIJ,
did not result in price drops sufficient to reduce these firms to unprofitabil-
ity. The two largest firms would be unlikely to act very aggressively,
moreover, as their variable costs appear to be somewhat higher than most of
the other firms. In addition, aggressive pricing is unlikely to cause the rapid
withdrawal of the new entrant since it should be able to secure substantial
funding resources. This is based on testimony from bankers in response to
questions concerning our projected scenario. Thus, once a firm has entered,
it would take considerable time to dislodge. Finally, the industry is ex-
pected to grow significantly in coming years, allowing QG to become es-
tablished without cutting into the revenues the incumbents earned prior to
the merger. This, too, would make an aggressive reaction less likely.
The Reaction of Customers
QG should be able to induce customers to try its widgets by offering a
promotional discount of 15% for two years. As industry experts testified,
HIJ was able to gain significant business by offering a comparable discount
for its first two years. Customers should be even more interested in placing
some of their business with QG if QG enters in the wake of a 7% price in-
crease by DEF and KLM.
TIMELINESS OF ENTRY
We reject the FTC's claim that design difficulties would prevent
timely entry. The experience of HIJ shows that the commitment of re-
sources can reduce the time needed to design a new widget. Because entry
would be timely, price would fall to a level slightly above the premerger
level in year two and would return to the premerger level at the beginning
of year three.
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CONCLUSION
This analysis shows that although the proposed merger would result in
a substantial increase in concentration, entry is likely to occur if the merged
firm raised prices significantly. In addition, such entry would reduce both
concentration and price in the market for widgets in a manner that is suffi-
cient and timely. As a result, even if the FTC has established a presumption
of anticompetitive effects, it has been rebutted.
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